The previous lesson separated picturing an absent object from seeing it, knowing what it looks like, and imagining without a picture. That distinction becomes more useful when we stop treating imagery as a single on-or-off ability. In this lesson, three dimensions matter: how vivid an image is, whether it is produced deliberately, and which sense it involves.
Allow about 40 minutes. The aim is to interpret descriptions of mental experience precisely, without assuming that one report tells you everything about a person’s mind.
Vividness: absent, faint, or strikingly clear
Two people can both understand the instruction “picture a familiar face” while reporting very different experiences. One may know whose face they are thinking of but experience no picture. Another may get a dim impression with few stable details. A third may experience a clear, detailed image. These reports differ in vividness—the reported clarity and sensory character of an image—not necessarily in whether the people know the face.
Researchers commonly call the reported absence of voluntary visual imagery aphantasia. Hypophantasia is sometimes used for imagery that is present but consistently faint or dim, while hyperphantasia describes exceptionally vivid imagery. The boundary between “aphantasia” and “very weak imagery” is not used consistently across studies: some researchers reserve aphantasia for no image at all, whereas others use it more broadly for unusually weak imagery. That is why a description such as “a faint picture appears” is often more informative than a label alone.
An international estimate of the prevalence of differing visual imagery abilities
Read this research article’s introduction for its descriptions of absent, dim, typical, and exceptionally vivid voluntary visual imagery. For now, focus on what the categories mean rather than on how many people fall into each one; the next module examines measurement and cutoffs.
In the Introduction, begin with the paragraph about Galton’s “Breakfast Table” study, at the imagery spectrum. Continue through the paragraph ending with typical imagery ability. Notice especially the contrast between a rating of “no image at all” and one of “vague and dim.”
Even at the vivid end, a mental image is not the same as perception. “As vivid as normal vision” describes a person’s rating of its clarity; it does not mean that an imagined face is mistaken for a face physically present. At the faint end, a dim image still differs from merely knowing facts about a face. The crucial distinction is whether any visual experience accompanies the thought.
Control: summoned images and images that arrive unbidden
Vividness describes what an image is like. Voluntariness describes how it arises. Deliberately picturing a beach while awake is voluntary imagery. A scene that unexpectedly comes to mind is involuntary imagery; visual experience in a dream is another case in which the dreamer is not ordinarily choosing each image.
These dimensions need not match. Someone who cannot summon a beach picture on request may report visual dreams. That report is compatible with an absence of voluntary waking imagery; it does not make the waking report contradictory. Nor does it establish that everyone with aphantasia has vivid dreams. Reports of dreams vary, and remembering a dream after waking is a further issue distinct from having experienced it.
Can you "see" images in your mind? Some people can't - Adam Zeman
Watch “Can you ‘see’ images in your mind? Some people can’t,” by Adam Zeman for TED-Ed, for its contrast between deliberate pictures and imagery during sleep.
Watch dream imagery. Focus on the distinction between deliberately calling up an image and experiencing one in a dream. The proposed account of different brain routes is an explanation under investigation, not a rule that predicts any particular person’s dreams.
It helps to keep the two dimensions separate in ordinary descriptions. “No picture appears when I try, but I sometimes dream in images” describes low or absent voluntary visual imagery with some reported involuntary visual experience. “I can summon an exceptionally clear picture” describes high voluntary visual vividness, but says nothing by itself about dreams.
Modality: a picture is not the whole sensory world
The word imagery often brings pictures to mind, but researchers also ask about experiences resembling other senses when the corresponding stimulus is absent. A tune heard “in the mind” is auditory imagery; a remembered scent is olfactory imagery. Researchers may also distinguish imagined taste (gustatory), touch on the skin (cutaneous), bodily movement (kinesthetic), and internal bodily sensations (organic imagery).
A report of no voluntary visual image therefore does not establish an inability to hear music internally or imagine the feeling of a movement. Equally, having a clear inner voice does not establish that one can picture a face. Different modalities can vary within the same person, even though they may also tend to vary together across groups.
Joel Pearson Extreme Imagery 2021 (Aphantasia and mental imagery)
In “Joel Pearson Extreme Imagery 2021 (Aphantasia and mental imagery),” Pearson introduces why studying only pictures misses variation in other sensory experiences.
Watch sensory modalities. Focus on the distinction between predominantly visual and more widespread reductions in reported imagery. Treat the percentages mentioned as dependent on that research sample and its classification choices, not as settled population rates.
A study that assessed several modalities makes the distinction more concrete. Its researchers grouped participants by responses about visual imagery and then examined their reported vividness across seven sensory modalities. They found more than one profile among participants in their low-visual-imagery group: some reported reduced imagery across modalities, while others showed a reduction concentrated in visual imagery. These are patterns in questionnaire responses, not exhaustive types into which every person must fit.
Read the study’s group definitions and its interpretation of the multisensory findings. This supplies the context needed to read the figure below without treating its lines as diagnoses of individual people.
In “2.2.3. Characteristics of aphantasia,” read the group definitions. Then, in “2.2.3.1. Multisensory imagery,” skip the detailed statistical tests and read the concluding paragraph, from “Collectively, multiple profile types were identified in the aphantasia group” through the comparison. Finally, in “4.3.1. Multisensory imagery,” read from the interpretation. Focus on why a visual-only measure cannot distinguish reduced visual imagery from reduced imagery across several senses.

The important feature of panel A is not any one line’s shape. It is that participants selected for low visual-imagery scores did not all show the same pattern on the other spokes. A chart of group averages cannot tell you what any one participant experiences, and a point on an axis is not a literal measure of whether that person has “zero” imagery. It does show why “cannot picture things” and “cannot imagine sensations of any kind” should not be used interchangeably.
Putting the dimensions together
Descriptions become easier to interpret when each dimension is kept explicit:
| Report | What it supports—and what it leaves open |
|---|---|
| “I deliberately try to picture a familiar place, but no image appears.” | Absent voluntary visual imagery is reported. Other senses and unbidden images remain unspecified. |
| “I can picture it, but the image is vague and fleeting.” | Faint voluntary visual imagery is present; this may be called hypophantasia under some definitions, rather than complete absence. |
| “I can deliberately call up a remarkably clear scene.” | Exceptionally vivid voluntary visual imagery is reported; other modalities are unspecified. |
| “I cannot picture a scene on request, but I sometimes see scenes in dreams and can hear tunes internally.” | The report separates voluntary visual, dream visual, and auditory experience rather than forcing a single label to cover all three. |
These distinctions also protect against stereotypes. None of the reports establishes how creative someone is, how well they remember, or whether they understand visual descriptions. Those are different questions requiring different evidence.
Closing perspective
Imagery varies along at least three useful dimensions: vividness, voluntariness, and sensory modality. Aphantasia usually directs attention to difficulty or inability with deliberate visual imagery; faint imagery, exceptionally vivid imagery, dreams, and imagery in other senses need to be described separately. Labels are useful shorthand, but precise reports carry more information.
The next module turns from interpreting reports to evaluating how researchers measure voluntary imagery, beginning with what a structured vividness questionnaire can establish compared with an informal online test.