Hello! Welcome to the first lesson of our fourth module, where we will explore the major internalist theories of justification.
In our previous module, we laid some crucial groundwork. We examined the epistemic regress problem—the challenge of justifying our beliefs without falling into an infinite chain of "whys." We also distinguished between justification that is fallible (could be wrong) and infallible (guaranteed to be right).
Today, we dive into one of the most significant and historically influential responses to the regress problem. Our learning outcome is to describe foundationalism as a response to the regress problem. This theory proposes that our knowledge has a definite structure, much like a building, with some beliefs resting upon others, which in turn rest upon a solid foundation.
The Regress Problem and Its Solutions
As a quick refresher, the epistemic regress problem arises when we ask for the justification of any belief. If every justification is another belief that also needs justification, we face a few unappealing options:
- The chain of justification goes on forever (infinitism).
- The chain circles back on itself (coherentism, which we'll discuss soon).
- The chain stops at a belief that isn't justified at all.
Foundationalism proposes a fourth, more attractive option: the chain stops at beliefs that are justified, but not by other beliefs.
We will focus on the structure on the left: Foundationalism.
The Foundationalist Architecture of Knowledge
The core idea of foundationalism is that there are two distinct types of justified beliefs. To get a clear sense of this proposal, let's watch the opening of a short lecture on the topic.
Foundationalism - Epistemology Video 8
This video, 'Foundationalism' by philosopher Victor Gijsbers, begins by recapping the regress problem and introducing the foundationalist solution.
Please watch from the beginning until 1:59. Focus on the core claim: that there exists a class of beliefs that are justified in a 'non-inferential' way, and these beliefs form the basis for everything else we know.
As the video explains, foundationalism stops the regress by positing a special class of beliefs. This gives us a two-part structure for our belief system. Epistemologists have specific terms for these two parts.
The Regress Problem, Foundationalism versus Coherentism
For precise definitions, let's turn to this excellent summary from philosopher James Pryor's course on the theory of knowledge.
Please read the short section titled 'Mediate and Immediate Justification.' This will clarify the formal distinction between beliefs that get their justification from other beliefs and those that don't.
To summarize Pryor's definitions:
- Mediately Justified Beliefs: These are justified inferentially, by being based on other beliefs you hold. Most of what you believe—that Jupiter is a planet, that your car is in the parking lot, that George Washington was the first US president—falls into this category.
- Immediately Justified Beliefs: These are justified non-inferentially. Their justification does not come from other beliefs. These are the "foundations" or, as they are often called, basic beliefs.
This structure is often visualized as a pyramid.
How Strong is the Foundation?
Once you accept the foundationalist picture, a critical question emerges: how strong is this foundation? Must our basic beliefs be absolutely certain and impossible to doubt? This is where our previous lesson on infallibilism and fallibilism becomes directly relevant.
Historically, foundationalists like René Descartes argued for a very strong, infallible foundation. This view is now often called Classical Foundationalism.
- Classical (or Strong) Foundationalism: This view holds that basic beliefs must be infallible, indubitable (impossible to doubt), and incorrigible (impossible to correct). The justification for all other, mediate beliefs must be deduced with logical certainty from this perfect foundation. This is an infallibilist approach.
More contemporary philosophers find this standard too high. They advocate for a more flexible version of the theory.
- Modest (or Weak) Foundationalism: This view allows basic beliefs to be fallible, dubitable, and defeasible. A belief can be immediately justified (e.g., by a perceptual experience) without being 100% certain. This justification is just a starting point, which could be overturned by new evidence. This is a fallibilist approach.
Most foundationalists today are modest foundationalists, as it seems to better capture the reality of human knowledge.
Test your understanding!
You look out your window and see that the street is wet, so you form the belief, "It has been raining."
According to the foundationalist picture, is your belief that "It has been raining" a basic (immediately justified) belief? Why or why not?
Show answer
No, it is a mediately justified belief. Your justification for believing it has been raining comes from another belief: your belief that "the street is wet." That belief, in turn, is justified by your perceptual experience of seeing the wet street. In this chain, the experience of seeing the wetness would be the foundation, while the inference that it rained is part of the superstructure.
What are the Candidates for Basic Beliefs?
So, if our knowledge is built on a foundation, what exactly is this foundation made of? Philosophers have proposed two main candidates for what can count as a properly basic belief.
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Self-Evident Truths: These are beliefs that you seem to grasp as true simply by understanding them. The classic example comes from Descartes: Cogito, ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). He argued that he could not possibly doubt his own existence as a thinking thing. Other candidates include simple logical truths (e.g., "A cannot be both A and not-A at the same time") and simple mathematical truths (e.g., "1+1=2").
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Beliefs about our own Perceptual Experience: This is perhaps the more common source of basic beliefs for most foundationalists. When you look at a red apple, you have an immediate experience of redness. A classical foundationalist might say the basic belief is not "there is a red apple" (because you could be hallucinating), but rather the more cautious belief, "I am having a red, round sensory experience" or "it seems to me that I see a red apple." A modest foundationalist might be willing to say that the belief "there is a red apple" is itself basic, even if it's fallible.
We will explore these candidates and the concept of "properly basic beliefs" in much more detail in our next lesson.
Conclusion
Today we've outlined foundationalism as a major and intuitive response to the epistemic regress problem. It provides a clear structure for our knowledge and a way to stop the endless chain of "why" questions.
Key Takeaways:
- Foundationalism solves the regress problem by positing that all justified beliefs ultimately rest on a foundation of immediately justified (non-inferential) beliefs.
- The rest of our knowledge consists of mediately justified (inferential) beliefs, which form a "superstructure" built upon this foundation.
- Classical Foundationalism is an infallibilist view, requiring the foundation to be absolutely certain.
- Modest Foundationalism is a fallibilist view, allowing the foundation to be uncertain and defeasible.
- The main candidates for foundational beliefs are self-evident truths and beliefs derived directly from perceptual experience.
Preview of the Next Lesson:
The natural next question is: what exactly makes a belief "basic"? What's the criterion for allowing a belief into the foundation? In our next lesson, we will focus on defining 'properly basic beliefs' and look at more detailed examples of what foundationalists have placed in this privileged category. This will set us up to understand some very interesting applications of this theory, particularly in the realm of religious epistemology which we will cover later in the course.