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Lesson 6

Applying UNCLOS Transit-Passage Rules to Merchant Ships

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The previous lesson separated two facts that are easy to conflate: a coastal state has sovereignty over its territorial sea, and a foreign ship may still have a right to cross it. This lesson puts that distinction to work. You will follow a merchant tanker through the Strait of Hormuz, identify the duties that come with transit passage, and assess what a bordering state may—and may not—require of it.

The focus is the UNCLOS rulebook rather than every disagreement about which states are bound by which rules. For the worked example, assume that both the tanker’s flag state and the bordering state are parties to UNCLOS. Allow about 40 minutes for the readings and analysis.


First establish what the voyage is

A tanker leaves a Persian Gulf port carrying oil to an overseas customer. It enters Hormuz, follows a route through the strait, and continues into the Gulf of Oman. Assume it crosses a bordering state’s territorial sea while doing so. The absence of a high-seas corridor, shown on the map in the previous lesson, does not by itself make this voyage subject to discretionary coastal-state permission.

Under UNCLOS Article 37, the relevant regime applies to straits used for international navigation between one area of high seas or exclusive economic zone and another. Article 38 calls navigation through such a strait for continuous and expeditious transit transit passage. The tanker’s oil cargo does not alter that definition: its route and conduct matter. Nor does the right grant access to a bordering state’s port without meeting that state’s conditions of entry. A ship traveling through the strait and one seeking to enter a port are making different legal claims.

Read the convention’s wording before applying it. This is a useful place to slow down: “unimpeded” passage and duties imposed on passing ships appear in the same set of articles.

United Nations convention on the law of the sea - SECTION 2.TRANSIT PASSAGE - Lovdata

Read the convention text reproduced by Lovdata for the scope of transit passage and the duties of ships. It supplies the rules for the tanker’s side of the analysis.

In Part III, Section 2, start at Article 37, “Scope of this section,” with the scope rule. Continue through Article 38, “Right of transit passage,” noting both the right in paragraph 1 and the purpose and route described in paragraph 2. Read Article 39, “Duties of ships and aircraft during transit passage,” especially paragraphs 1 and 2 on conduct, safety and pollution. Finish with Article 40, “Research and survey activities,” ending at the survey rule. The webpage repeats some provisions in its layout; you need only read each article once.

Article 39 gives the tanker several simultaneous obligations. It must proceed without delay; refrain from threats or force against a bordering state; and avoid activities unrelated to its normal mode of continuous and expeditious transit, unless force majeure or distress makes them necessary. It must also comply with generally accepted international rules on safety at sea, including collision prevention, and on preventing pollution from ships. Article 40 adds a distinct limit: the tanker cannot use the crossing to conduct research or surveys without prior authorization from the states bordering the strait.

These are practical constraints, not merely a demand to sail quickly. A master who maintains a safe course and speed, follows applicable collision-prevention rules, and continues toward the strait’s exit is exercising the right in the manner UNCLOS describes. A master who deliberately stops to survey the seabed is doing something different. An engine failure that forces a stop is different again: distress is expressly recognized in Article 39’s restriction on activities outside normal transit. The facts behind a delay therefore matter.



What the bordering state may regulate

A right of transit passage does not remove the bordering state from the picture. UNCLOS allows regulation directed at particular purposes, while limiting the use of that regulation to obstruct navigation. This is the other half of the worked example.

United Nations convention on the law of the sea - SECTION 2.TRANSIT PASSAGE - Lovdata

Continue in the Lovdata reproduction of UNCLOS to see which coastal-state measures are compatible with transit passage and where the convention draws the line.

Begin at Article 41, “Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in straits used for international navigation,” with the safety purpose. Read through paragraph 7, including how schemes are adopted, publicized on charts and respected by ships. Then read Article 42, “Laws and regulations of States bordering straits relating to transit passage,” focusing on the permitted subjects in paragraph 1, the limits in paragraph 2 and the publicity and compliance duties in paragraphs 3–4. Note Article 43’s provision on cooperation over navigational aids and pollution. Finish at Article 44, “Duties of States bordering straits,” through the final prohibition. Some article text appears twice in the webpage layout; reading it once is sufficient.

Article 41 permits bordering states to designate sea lanes and traffic-separation schemes where needed for safe passage, through the process the article specifies. That process includes referral to the competent international organization, agreement on adoption, and clear indication of the resulting routes on publicized charts. Ships exercising transit passage must respect applicable schemes established in accordance with the article. A ship cannot invoke freedom of passage as permission to ignore a valid traffic scheme.

Article 42 likewise permits laws on specified matters: navigational safety and traffic regulation as provided in Article 41; pollution control giving effect to applicable international discharge rules; prevention of fishing by fishing vessels; and loading or unloading contrary to specified customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary rules. The state must publicize these laws, and passing foreign ships must comply with them. But a regulation cannot discriminate among foreign ships in form or in fact, or have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing transit passage. A measure’s label is therefore not decisive: a “safety rule” that functions as a blanket ban must still pass Article 42’s test.

Finally, Article 44 says bordering states shall not hamper transit passage, must give appropriate publicity to navigational or overflight dangers they know about, and cannot suspend transit passage. Those duties leave room to warn ships about a hazard and manage navigation within the convention’s limits. They do not provide a power to shut the strait to otherwise qualifying merchant traffic.



Apply both sides of the rule to one crossing

Consider a more detailed version of the tanker’s voyage. The tanker follows an applicable, properly established traffic-separation scheme. Its crew maintains collision-prevention practices, makes no unauthorized discharge, undertakes no seabed survey, and proceeds toward the Gulf of Oman without an unnecessary stop. A bordering state has learned of a navigational hazard nearby and gives ships appropriate public notice. Its authorities then announce that all foreign oil tankers must obtain a political clearance before crossing and must wait outside the strait until clearance is granted.

The tanker is, on these facts, exercising transit passage consistently with the duties examined above. Carrying oil is ordinary commercial navigation, not a prohibited activity under Article 39 or a reason on its own to deny passage. Following the applicable lane also satisfies the distinct Article 41 duty.

The state meets one obligation by publicizing the known hazard. Its additional clearance-and-wait requirement is a different matter. Applied to all foreign tankers regardless of their navigational conduct, it would impede continuous transit and, if clearance could be withheld, effectively deny the passage protected by Articles 38 and 44. Calling the requirement a traffic measure would not cure that effect under Article 42. The state can communicate the danger and use lawful safety arrangements; it cannot turn transit passage into a generally suspendable permission system.

Now change one fact at a time. If the tanker leaves an applicable lane without a necessity arising from navigation, its conduct calls for scrutiny under Article 41. If it begins a deliberate seabed survey, Article 40 requires prior authorization for that activity. If a mechanical failure forces it to stop, the delay should be assessed against the distress and force majeure qualification in Article 39 rather than treated automatically as a breach. A particular ship’s misconduct does not, however, give a bordering state a general right to suspend every other ship’s transit. Whether and how authorities may respond to an individual violation requires attention to the applicable rule and the specific facts; it is not a blank cheque to close the route.

A compact way to analyze a report of a passage dispute is to keep four findings separate: Does the voyage qualify as transit passage? What did the ship actually do? What rule supports the coastal measure? What effect does that measure have on passage? Separating those findings prevents two opposite errors—treating the strait as beyond coastal regulation, or treating coastal sovereignty as unlimited control over transit.



Conclusion

For a qualifying merchant voyage through Hormuz, UNCLOS pairs a right with duties. The ship may make continuous, expeditious transit, but must navigate safely, observe applicable lanes and pollution rules, and avoid unrelated activities such as unauthorized surveys. A bordering state may make and publicize certain safety and other specified regulations, and must warn of known dangers; it may not discriminate so as to impair the right, hamper transit passage, or suspend it.

The next lesson adds a complication set aside here: the US, Iranian and Omani positions do not rest on identical treaty commitments. That makes it important to distinguish what UNCLOS says from which legal basis a particular state accepts for applying a passage rule.