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Lesson 7

Strait of Hormuz: Treaty Commitments and Customary Law Disputes

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Hello. The previous lesson treated a tanker’s passage through Hormuz under UNCLOS: the ship has duties, while a bordering state may regulate safety but may not suspend transit passage. That account assumed the relevant states were bound by the convention. Here the assumption changes. You will compare what the United States, Iran and Oman say about passage, and separate treaty obligations from claims about customary international law. Allow about 40 minutes.


Start with the rule, then ask whom it binds

The map shows why a disagreement about legal rules matters here. Iran faces Oman’s Musandam Peninsula across the strait, and the marked shipping routes run close to their coasts. Coastal sovereignty and a right of passage can therefore apply to the same waters; neither fact, by itself, settles the terms on which a foreign vessel crosses.

The Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman, with the UAE on the southern approaches. The map marks territorial-sea limits and a traffic-separation scheme; it illustrates the proximity of shipping routes to the coasts, not which legal position prevails.

Before comparing positions, return briefly to the convention itself. Its text is our reference point for transit passage, even though not all three states have joined it.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Read the UN text to fix the distinction between what UNCLOS provides and whether a particular state is bound by it.

In Part III, Section 2, read Articles 37 and 38, beginning with scope and passage. Focus on the right of continuous and expeditious transit. Then go to Article 44, immediately before the heading for Section 3, and read the coastal duty. You can skim the intervening articles, which the previous lesson covered.

A treaty binds its parties—states that have completed the steps required to become bound by it. Being affected by a treaty, or even signing it, is not the same as ratifying it. Oman has ratified UNCLOS. The United States has not joined it, and Iran signed but has not ratified it. Thus, “UNCLOS says passage cannot be suspended” accurately describes the convention; it does not, without a further legal argument, establish that the United States and Iran owe every UNCLOS passage obligation as treaty parties.

That further argument may invoke customary international law: a rule evidenced by sufficiently general state practice accompanied by a sense that the practice is legally required, often called opinio juris. A treaty provision can also reflect customary law, but its presence in a widely adopted treaty does not alone prove that every detail binds non-parties. Conversely, staying outside a treaty does not necessarily free a state from an independently established customary rule. The scope of the customary rule is the central disagreement in this lesson.



Three positions, with different legal foundations

The following analysis sets out the states’ positions and then evaluates them. Read those as two distinct tasks. A state’s declaration tells you what it claims; it does not, on its own, settle what the law requires.

The Strait of Hormuz – QIL-QDI

Read this QIL-QDI legal analysis for its account of the Iranian, Omani and US positions. Its later assessment is an argument, not an agreed ruling.

In subsection 2, “The Strait of Hormuz. Its legal regime according to Iran and Oman and according to the U.S.,” start after the opening geographical paragraph, at the three positions. Track the paragraphs beginning “First of all, Iran,” “Unlike Iran, Oman,” and “The official position of the U.S. Government.” Notice when the author moves from reporting a position to offering a view about it. You need not retain the intervening historical examples or oil-flow figures.

The United States is a user of the strait but not a party to UNCLOS. Its position is that the convention’s transit-passage rule also reflects customary international law. On that view, a qualifying ship may cross continuously and expeditiously without a general requirement for coastal-state permission; the rule covers warships as well as merchant ships and includes overflight. The US position does not erase the ship’s duties, such as refraining from threats or force. It says a coastal state cannot turn the type of vessel alone into a reason to block otherwise lawful transit. The United States is party to an earlier, 1958 convention concerning the territorial sea, but that treaty did not establish UNCLOS’s broader transit-passage regime.

Iran signed UNCLOS but did not ratify it. In its declaration on signing, Iran argued that transit passage was part of a negotiated package and should not automatically be treated as customary law binding non-parties. It claims a narrower regime of non-suspendable innocent passage in Hormuz, alongside a requirement of prior authorization for foreign warships entering its territorial sea. These are distinct propositions: saying that ordinary passage cannot be suspended does not concede the fuller transit-passage rights claimed by the United States. Nor does Iran’s signature make it a UNCLOS party obliged to implement every transit-passage article as a treaty commitment.

Oman differs from both: it has ratified UNCLOS, yet it declared that its understanding of passage leaves room for security measures, particularly prior permission for warships crossing its territorial sea, including waters of Hormuz. The analysis also notes Omani legislation that was not changed upon ratification. Those facts establish a tension between Oman’s stated position and the convention’s transit-passage provisions; they do not make a domestic permission rule an automatic exception to Oman’s treaty obligations. A declaration accompanying ratification cannot, merely by stating a preference, rewrite the convention’s terms.

The comparison is easiest to keep straight if the legal basis remains visible:

State UNCLOS status Position relevant to Hormuz
United States Not a party Claims the fuller transit-passage rule applies as customary law
Iran Signed, not ratified Rejects automatically treating that fuller rule as custom; claims non-suspendable innocent passage and prior authorization for warships
Oman Party Has declared a security-based prior-permission position for warships, creating tension with its UNCLOS commitments

This is not a contest over whether the bordering states have any sovereignty. They do have territorial seas. It is a contest over which passage rights limit the exercise of that sovereignty, particularly for military vessels.



The disputed customary-law step

Why not resolve the disagreement simply by pointing to UNCLOS Article 38? For Oman, the convention supplies a treaty starting point. For Iran and the United States, neither of which is a party, the argument for the full transit-passage regime must stand on another legal basis. The difference matters because transit passage extends beyond innocent passage: notably, it includes overflight, and its terms do not expressly require submarines to surface while transiting in their normal mode.

The QIL-QDI author challenges the US customary-law argument. The author accepts a customary minimum of passage that cannot simply be suspended, but argues that state practice and objections by states bordering straits do not establish all of UNCLOS transit passage as custom. That is a narrower conclusion than the US position. It is also the author’s interpretation of contested evidence, not a definitive judgment that disposes of the disagreement.

The Strait of Hormuz – QIL-QDI

Read the same author’s conclusion to see precisely where an asserted common minimum ends and the contested fuller right begins.

In subsection 3, “Conclusions. The legal regime of the Strait of Hormuz under customary law,” read from the legal conclusion. Stop before the final paragraph about convenient routes. Pay particular attention to the shift between the paragraph affirming non-suspendable passage and the paragraph questioning whether UNCLOS transit passage is customary law.

There is therefore more agreement than a simple “open versus closed” headline suggests, but less agreement than “everyone accepts transit passage” implies. The positions described here do not amount to a shared claim that a bordering state may shut all ordinary shipping at will. The sharpest legal differences concern the scope of the passage right, especially warship authorization, overflight and submarine transit. Actual incidents also require their own facts: an allegation that a particular ship threatened force is different from a claim that all ships of its nationality need permission.

Consider the legal descriptions of two otherwise uneventful crossings. For a merchant ship proceeding continuously through the strait, the three positions offer much stronger common ground for passage without a general shutdown, though they reach it by different routes. For a US warship making the same crossing without seeking permission, the disagreement becomes direct: the United States invokes customary transit passage; Iran asserts its prior-authorization requirement; Oman has ratified the treaty but has also stated a prior-permission position. You cannot determine the US warship’s treaty entitlement merely by quoting UNCLOS as though the United States were a party, or determine Oman’s treaty duties merely by quoting its domestic rule.

Finally, keep a claim about a right separate from a prediction about enforcement. Ships may in practice cross without requesting permission even where a state maintains a permission requirement. Such practice is relevant evidence in a customary-law debate, but one crossing alone cannot establish the entire legal rule. Equally, announcing a requirement does not prove that it is valid under an applicable treaty.



Conclusion

The key distinction is treaty commitment versus claimed customary rule. Oman is bound by UNCLOS as a party, although its stated warship-permission position sits in tension with transit passage. The United States and Iran are not UNCLOS parties: the United States argues that the fuller transit-passage regime nevertheless binds as custom, while Iran disputes that extension and claims a narrower passage regime with prior authorization for warships. A legal analysis should identify both the right a state claims and the source it says makes that right applicable.

The next module turns from competing legal positions to confrontations at sea. It will be important there to distinguish a state’s asserted justification from what ships and naval forces actually did.