Introduction
Welcome to our first lesson on Martin Heidegger. In the previous module, we concluded our study of Edmund Husserl, focusing on his later concepts like the lifeworld and the central role of transcendental subjectivity in constituting all meaning. For Husserl, the purified ego, revealed through the phenomenological reduction, is the ultimate source from which the world receives its sense.
Heidegger was Husserl's student, and his major work, Being and Time, was even dedicated to his teacher. However, Heidegger took Husserl's phenomenological method in a radically new direction. He believed that starting with "consciousness" or a "transcendental subject" was already a mistake, one inherited from centuries of philosophical tradition.
In this lesson, we will explore Heidegger's fundamental alternative. Our goal is to explain Heidegger's concept of 'Dasein' as a replacement for the traditional 'subject'. We will investigate why Heidegger felt this move was necessary and what core features distinguish Dasein from the subject of philosophers like Descartes and even, in some respects, Husserl.
1. The Problem with the 'Subject'
Heidegger's philosophy begins with a deep critique of the Western philosophical tradition. He argues that since Plato, and especially since Descartes, philosophy has misunderstood its own starting point. The tradition posits a 'subject'—a mind, a consciousness, an ego—that is fundamentally separate from an 'object'—the external world.
This subject-object split creates what Heidegger sees as a series of philosophical pseudo-problems. For example, if the subject is a self-contained thinking thing, how can it ever be certain that its 'representations' of the world actually correspond to the world itself? We are left trying to build a bridge from a mind "inside" to a world "outside."
To understand Heidegger's critique, let's watch a few segments from a video that directly addresses his departure from subjectivism.
Is Heidegger's Dasein Just Another Subject?
The philosopher Johannes A. Niederhauser here explains Heidegger's core reasons for rejecting the traditional concept of the subject. He traces its philosophical origins and points out the problems Heidegger saw with it.
Please watch the following three segments: 01:23 - 04:41: Focus on the core claim that the concept of subjectivity is 'ontologically unfounded'. 04:55 - 07:14: Pay attention to the definition of the subject as 'hypokeimenon'—a substratum or underlying thing—and how this leads to the subject-object dichotomy. 13:23 - 15:34: Note the distinction made between the subject's 'faculties' and Dasein's 'ways of being'.
From this video and Heidegger's perspective, the traditional 'subject' can be summarized as:
- A Substance (
hypokeimenon): It is conceived as a thing or substance that underlies our experiences, a container for mental states. - Separated from the World: It stands over and against a world of objects that it perceives or thinks about.
- Characterized by Faculties: It is understood as possessing distinct capacities, such as reason, perception, and will, like tools in a toolbox.
- Prioritizing the Theoretical: Its primary relationship to the world is one of knowing—it is a 'spectator' observing objects.
Heidegger argues that this entire framework misrepresents our fundamental way of being. We don't start as isolated minds that later try to connect to a world; our being is, from the very start, worldly. To capture this, he introduces a new term.
2. The Alternative: Dasein
To avoid the philosophical baggage of terms like 'subject', 'mind', or 'person', Heidegger coins the term Dasein.
- Etymology: The German word
Daseinis composed ofDa('there' or 'here') andSein('being'). It means 'being-there'.
Dasein is Heidegger's term for the kind of being that we ourselves are. It is not just another word for 'human'. It is a philosophical term meant to capture a specific ontological structure.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy offers a clear and rigorous introduction to this concept.
Martin Heidegger - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains the rationale behind Heidegger's introduction of Dasein and its central characteristics.
Please read the section titled 'So how do we carry out fundamental ontology, and thus answer the question of the meaning of Being?'. You will find it within Section 2.2.1, 'The Question'. Focus on how Dasein is defined and what makes this entity unique.
As the article explains, Dasein is unique among all other entities for a specific reason: Being is an "issue" for it. A rock simply is. A tree simply is. But Dasein is an entity whose own being is a matter of concern for it. We care about who we are and what our lives mean. Dasein's being is a field of possibilities that it must navigate.
This means Dasein is not a 'what' but a 'who'. Its essence is not a fixed set of properties, but its own existence. This is a crucial shift.
3. Dasein versus the Subject: A Direct Comparison
Let's consolidate the key distinctions between Heidegger's Dasein and the traditional subject.
| Feature | The Traditional Subject (e.g., Cartesian) | Dasein (Heideggerian) |
|---|---|---|
| Fundamental Nature | A what. A thinking substance (res cogitans) with fixed properties (faculties). |
A who. An existence defined by its possibilities. Its essence lies in its existence. |
| Relation to World | Subject-Object Dichotomy. The subject is separate from and stands over against an external world of objects. | Being-in-the-world. A unitary phenomenon. Dasein is intrinsically worldly; the world is constitutive of its being. |
| Primary Mode of Being | Presence-at-hand (Vorhandensein). It is conceived as a thing that is simply present, like an object of scientific study. |
Existence (Existenz). It is a process of 'standing out', defined by its projects, concerns, and possibilities. |
| Primary Engagement | Theoretical. Knowing, perceiving, or representing objects. | Practical. Concerned, skillful engagement with a world of equipment (ready-to-hand). |
To solidify this distinction, let's look at two more brief texts.
[PDF] Time and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger
First, this excerpt from a chapter by Charles Guignon explains why Heidegger's study of Dasein is not merely anthropology (the study of humans) but fundamental ontology (the study of the meaning of Being).
Please read the paragraph that begins 'So Heidegger sets the stage...'. It clearly articulates why Heidegger focuses on Dasein and avoids the subject-object framework.
This first text emphasizes that Dasein is our gateway to the question of Being itself. The analysis of Dasein is not an end in itself, but the necessary starting point for a more fundamental philosophical inquiry.
Now, let's look at the crucial distinction between Dasein and objects.
[PDF] Time and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger
Second, this passage from the same chapter distinguishes the way Dasein is ('who') from the way objects are ('what'), introducing the key terms 'existentialia' and 'categories'.
Please read the two paragraphs under the heading 'The ontological difference between nature and history'. Focus on the distinction between Dasein as a 'who' and presence-at-hand ('Vorhandensein') as a 'what'.
This introduces a vital piece of terminology. The structures that define objects (Vorhandensein) are categories (e.g., mass, color, location). The structures that define Dasein are existentialia—these are not properties a thing has, but modes of being it is (e.g., understanding, mood, discourse).
By replacing the 'subject' with 'Dasein', Heidegger is not just swapping labels. He is re-founding philosophy on what he sees as a more primordial ground: our engaged, temporal, and worldly existence, rather than a detached, worldless consciousness.
Conclusion
In this lesson, we have taken the first step into Heidegger's philosophy by understanding his motivation for creating a new starting point. We saw that the traditional concept of the subject, particularly from Descartes onward, was seen by Heidegger as ontologically flawed and the source of persistent philosophical confusion.
Key Takeaways:
- Heidegger critiques the traditional 'subject' as a self-contained substance that is fundamentally separate from the world, leading to the subject-object dichotomy.
- He replaces this concept with Dasein, a term for the being that we are, whose nature is not substance but existence.
- Dasein is unique because Being is an issue for it; its own being is a matter of concern and possibility.
- Unlike the subject, which is a 'what' with properties (categories), Dasein is a 'who' defined by its ways of being (existentialia).
- The most fundamental structure of Dasein is its inseparable unity with the world, which Heidegger calls Being-in-the-world.
Preview of the Next Lesson:
We have just been introduced to the term 'Being-in-the-world' as Dasein's unitary structure. In our next lesson, we will dissect this crucial concept. We will explore what Heidegger means by 'in-ness' and 'world', and see how it describes a mode of being that is radically different from a physical object being 'in' a container.