Critiquing Merleau-Ponty's Intersubjectivity

1. The Primacy of Ethics: Introducing Emmanuel Levinas

To grasp Levinas's critique of Merleau-Ponty, we must first understand his own philosophical project. Levinas argues that the entire history of Western philosophy, from Plato to Heidegger, has made a fundamental error. It has prioritized ontology (the study of Being) over ethics (the relationship to the Other).

He calls this tradition a philosophy of totality and the Same. It begins with the self, the ego, or consciousness, and attempts to understand everything else—the world, other people—by fitting it into the self's own categories. In this process, Levinas argues, the radical difference or alterity of the Other is lost, reduced to being just another object for the self's consciousness.

Against this, Levinas proposes that ethics is "first philosophy." The primary philosophical event is not knowing, but the face-to-face encounter with another person. This encounter with the Other introduces the idea of infinity—something that can never be fully grasped, contained, or totalized by the self.

To get a clear overview of these foundational ideas, please watch the following video.

As the video explains, for Levinas, the Other is not someone "like me." The ethical relationship is not based on empathy or shared characteristics, but on the recognition of a radical, transcendent difference that commands a response from me.

2. Levinas's Critique of Phenomenology

Given his core principles, you can probably anticipate why Levinas would have a problem with phenomenology. While he was deeply influenced by Husserl and Heidegger, he ultimately saw phenomenology as the most sophisticated form of the "imperialism of the Same."

Why? Because phenomenology, by its very method, starts from the first-person perspective. It seeks to understand how the world and others are disclosed to consciousness. For Levinas, this approach, no matter how nuanced, inevitably reduces the Other to a phenomenon for me. The Other's absolute exteriority is compromised.

The following segment of the video addresses this point directly.

Levinas argues that the relationship with the Other is not one of revelation or disclosure (key phenomenological terms), but one that maintains the Other's "Transcendence" and "height." With this framework in place, we can now turn to Levinas's specific criticisms of Merleau-Ponty.

The following reading introduces the two main lines of attack.

To summarize, Levinas's critique operates on two levels:

1. The General Charge ("Imperialism of the Same"): Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, like all others, cannot help but reduce the Other to the self's own terms.
2. The Specific Charge ("Unaccountable Affection"): Merleau-Ponty's model of intersubjectivity seems to presuppose a positive, non-indifferent, almost affectionate connection, rather than accounting for the radical separation and ethical demand that Levinas sees in the encounter with the Other.

3. The Heart of the Disagreement: Reversibility vs. Irreversibility

Levinas's critique becomes most pointed when he engages with Merleau-Ponty's concepts of intercorporeality and reversibility. As you know, Merleau-Ponty describes how we perceive others through a shared bodily space. In his later work, he develops this into the idea of reversibility—the model of my right hand touching my left, where the touching hand is also touched. He extends this model to the intersubjective realm. In a handshake, for example, there is a synergy, an intertwining.

For Levinas, this is precisely the problem. Extending this model of reversibility to the relationship between two people is the ultimate "imperialism of the same." It assumes a symmetrical, reciprocal relationship and superimposes the experience of my own body onto the radically separate reality of the Other.

This reading details this exact point of conflict.

Levinas insists that the ethical relationship is fundamentally irreversible and asymmetrical. I am responsible for the Other in a way that the Other is not responsible for me. This is not a relationship of two equal subjects intertwining in a shared 'Flesh'; it is a relationship between a self and a transcendent Other who summons the self to responsibility.

The following text frames this as the core distinction between the two thinkers.

As Schroeder concludes, for Merleau-Ponty, "The mystery of the other is nothing but the mystery of myself." Self and other are intertwined in a chiasmatic, reversible relationship. For Levinas, the mystery resides wholly in the Other. The relationship is an irreversible, asymmetrical ethical demand that transcends any shared being or ontology.

4. Summarizing the Criticism

Now, let's synthesize these points to fulfill our learning outcome. A summary of Levinas's key criticism of Merleau-Ponty's theory of intersubjectivity should contain the following points:

• The Foundational Principle: Levinas critiques all ontology, including Merleau-Ponty's, as a "philosophy of the Same" that reduces the radical alterity of the Other to the self's own terms and experience. He argues for the primacy of an asymmetrical ethical relationship over a symmetrical ontological one.
• The Target in Merleau-Ponty: This critique finds its main target in Merleau-Ponty's concepts of intercorporeality and reversibility. Levinas sees these as the prime mechanisms through which the Other is absorbed into a shared system (the 'Flesh', the 'chiasm'), thereby destroying its transcendence.
• The Core Conflict (Reversibility vs. Irreversibility):
  • Merleau-Ponty proposes a reversible and reciprocal model. Like one's own two hands touching, the self and Other are intertwined in a shared sensory fabric. Their relationship is a chiasm (an intertwining).
  • Levinas insists the relationship is irreversible and asymmetrical. The encounter with the Face of the Other is not a mutual experience but an ethical command that places the self in a unique position of responsibility. The "distance" between self and Other is absolute and must be preserved.
• The Conclusion: Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity, by emphasizing shared embodiment and reciprocity, ultimately fails, in Levinas's view, to account for the most crucial aspect of the other person: their absolute, irreducible otherness, which is the very source of ethics.

Conclusion

Today, you have engaged with one of the most significant critical encounters in 20th-century phenomenology. By analyzing Emmanuel Levinas's critique, you have not only learned to summarize a complex philosophical argument but have also gained a deeper appreciation for the stakes involved in defining the self-other relationship.

Key Takeaways:

• Levinas's Core Project: Philosophy should begin with ethics (the asymmetrical relation to the infinite Other), not ontology (the totalizing study of Being, or the Same).
• Critique of Phenomenology: Levinas sees phenomenology as an "imperialism of the same" because its first-person method inevitably reduces the Other to a phenomenon for a subject.
• Critique of Merleau-Ponty: Levinas specifically targets Merleau-Ponty's concept of reversibility, arguing that it wrongly imposes a symmetrical and reciprocal model on the fundamentally asymmetrical and irreversible ethical relationship.

Preview of the Next Module:

Levinas's powerful critique forces us to look again at Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy. Is Levinas's interpretation fair? Does the concept of 'Flesh' truly create a 'totality' that absorbs the Other? Or does it offer a more subtle way of thinking about difference and connection? To answer these questions, we must first gain a rigorous understanding of Merleau-Ponty's late ontology in its own right. That will be the focus of our next module, as we dive into the dense and fascinating concepts of 'Flesh,' 'the chiasm,' and 'wild Being' from The Visible and the Invisible.