Introduction
Welcome to our next lesson. In our previous session, we explored Merleau-Ponty's concept of the body schema. We defined it not as a mental picture or representation (a "body image"), but as the dynamic, pre-reflective system of motor skills and possibilities that unifies the lived body. The body schema is the silent, operational structure of our "I can."
Today, we will examine the action that this structure enables. If the body schema is the "how" of our bodily unity, we must now ask about the "what"—what is the nature of the body's directedness toward the world? Merleau-Ponty calls this motor intentionality.
Our goal is to explain motor intentionality and, most importantly, to distinguish it from the concept of cognitive intentionality that you encountered in our study of Husserl. This distinction is not merely a technical refinement; it marks a fundamental break from Husserl and is central to Merleau-Ponty's entire philosophical project of grounding consciousness in the lived body.
1. The Point of Departure: Husserl's Cognitive Intentionality
To understand Merleau-Ponty's innovation, we must first have a clear picture of what he is moving away from. Let's briefly revisit Husserl's conception of intentionality.
As we discussed in Module 1, Husserl defined intentionality as the essential "aboutness" or "directedness" of consciousness. Every conscious act (noesis) is directed toward an intended object as it is meant (noema). For Husserl, this is primarily a cognitive affair. Consciousness is like a beam of light that illuminates objects and, in so doing, constitutes their meaning for us. The fundamental formula for this kind of intentionality is "I think that...".
But how does Husserl account for the body? In his later work, particularly the manuscripts published as Ideas II, Husserl does grant the body a role. However, it remains a secondary and puzzling one. He sees the body as a unique object—a "bearer of sensations"—that the transcendental ego identifies as "mine" through a quasi-objective process, primarily through the localization of touch sensations.
The following reading explains this specific Husserlian viewpoint, which will serve as our primary point of contrast with Merleau-Ponty.
The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
In his essay 'The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty', Taylor Carman explains Husserl's specific theory of bodily intentionality. Understanding this is crucial for seeing exactly what Merleau-Ponty rejects and transforms.
Please read the section titled 'HUSSERL’S NOTION OF THE BODY AS A “BEARER OF SENSATIONS”' (pages 210-214). Focus on how Husserl privileges the sense of touch and describes the body as a 'field of localization' for sensations. Note the intellectualist character of this process: the 'I' first has sensations and then attributes them to a body, thereby constituting it as its own.
As Carman highlights, even when discussing the body, Husserl's framework remains fundamentally intellectualist. The body is constituted as "mine" through a complex process of associating sensations with a physical object. The "I" remains a pure, disembodied consciousness that relates to a body. It is precisely this picture that Merleau-Ponty seeks to overturn.
2. Merleau-Ponty's "Original Intentionality"
For Merleau-Ponty, the body's directedness toward the world is not a secondary, constituted phenomenon. It is primary and original. He argues that beneath the "I think that..." of cognitive intentionality lies a more fundamental, bodily directedness: the "I can." This is motor intentionality.
Motor intentionality is not a thought about the world or a representation of an action. It is the body's practical, skillful, and unthinking grasp on the world. It's your body's tending toward the doorknob, your fingers finding the right keys on a keyboard, or your feet navigating an uneven path. It is the body itself being intentional.
This short video provides a concise definition of this concept, which Merleau-Ponty calls "original intentionality."
Phil 492: Merleau-Ponty The Ambiguity of Being-in-the-world: Phantom Limb and Bodily Intentionality
The philosopher Kyle Banick directly explains Merleau-Ponty's idea that bodily movement, or 'motricity,' is the original form of intentionality.
Please watch from 10:13 to 11:45. Pay close attention to the contrast drawn between consciousness as an 'I think' (Husserl) and consciousness as an 'I can' (Merleau-Ponty). Also, note the important warning: this bodily intentionality doesn't just 'highlight' pre-existing objects; it projects the very horizons within which objects can appear.
To deepen this understanding with more rigorous terminology, we will turn to a text that unpacks the philosophical lineage of this idea. Merleau-Ponty develops his notion from a concept he found in Husserl's later manuscripts: "operative intentionality" (fungierende Intentionalität). This was Husserl's term for a kind of hidden, habitual intentionality that is already at work "operating" before any explicit act of thought. Merleau-Ponty takes this seed of an idea and makes it the root of his entire philosophy of the body.
[PDF] THE HISTORY OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Dermot Moran's chapter on the history of intentionality contains an excellent section on Merleau-Ponty's development of the concept.
Please read the section titled '30.5 MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY'S MOTOR INTENTIONALITY AND THE “INTENTIONAL ARC”' (pages 593-595). As you read, focus on: How Merleau-Ponty finds, beneath Husserl's 'intentionality of representations,' a more 'profound intentionality' which he calls 'operative intentionality' or 'motor intentionality.' The central claim: 'consciousness is originarily not an “I think that” but rather an “I can.”' The use of the Schneider case to distinguish between abstract pointing (which Schneider cannot do) and concrete grasping (which he can). This shows the difference between cognitive and motor intentionality in practice.
3. A Systematic Comparison
The distinction between these two forms of intentionality is one of the most significant pivots in the history of phenomenology. Given your background in mathematics, a systematic, side-by-side comparison may be the most effective way to solidify your understanding.
| Feature | Husserl's Cognitive Intentionality | Merleau-Ponty's Motor Intentionality |
|---|---|---|
| Formula | "I think that..." | "I can..." |
| Subject | A transcendental ego; a pure consciousness. | The lived body (Leib). |
| Nature of the Act | A cognitive act of meaning-giving (noesis), representation, or judgment. | A pre-reflective, practical, skillful bodily comportment. |
| Relation to World | Stands at a distance from the world, constituting the meaning of its objects. | Inhabits the world, is geared toward tasks and solicited by situations. |
| Role of the Body | A quasi-object; a "bearer of sensations" that the ego comes to identify as "mine." | The very subject of perception and action; our "point of view on the world." |
| Example | Analyzing the geometric properties of a cube. | Reaching out to grasp a hammer to drive a nail. |
In essence, Husserl describes a consciousness that thinks the world, while Merleau-Ponty describes a body that lives or inhabits the world. For Husserl, the body is a problem to be solved by consciousness. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the very possibility of having a world at all. As Taylor Carman puts it, for Merleau-Ponty, "the body in its perceptual capacity just is the I in its most primordial aspect."
4. The Intentional Arc
Merleau-Ponty expands the concept of motor intentionality with a powerful metaphor: the intentional arc (arc intentionnel).
This is not about a single, isolated action. The intentional arc is the overarching power of the body schema that projects our entire meaningful world around us. It is what links our motor powers to our perceptual world, our past experiences to our present situation, and our body to our environment, holding them all together in a unified, coherent whole. It is the "tight connection between the agent and the world" that Dreyfus mentions in the reading from Moran.
When you learn to drive a car, the intentional arc is what reconfigures your body schema to include the vehicle. The space of the road, the feel of the pedals, and the position of other cars are no longer objective data you think about; they become part of the field of your immediate bodily action. Your intentional arc has expanded to project a "driver's world."
This concept beautifully synthesizes the themes of the last two lessons:
- The body schema is the underlying structure of our motor possibilities.
- Motor intentionality is the exercise of those possibilities in concrete actions.
- The intentional arc is the overarching dynamic that unifies these actions into a coherent, lived world.
Conclusion
Today we have defined motor intentionality and drawn a sharp contrast with Husserl's cognitive intentionality. This shift from the "I think" to the "I can" is Merleau-Ponty's foundational move, allowing him to anchor philosophy firmly in the reality of our lived, bodily existence.
Key Takeaways:
- Cognitive Intentionality (Husserl): The mind's directedness ("I think that..."), where a transcendental ego constitutes the meaning of objects. The body is treated as a quasi-object, a bearer of sensations.
- Motor Intentionality (Merleau-Ponty): The lived body's pre-reflective, skillful directedness toward the world ("I can..."). It is an "operative intentionality" that is more fundamental than thought.
- The distinction is not just theoretical; it is visible in pathological cases like Schneider, who loses the abstract, cognitive ability to point but retains the concrete, motor ability to grasp or scratch.
- The Intentional Arc is the overarching power that unifies our motor skills, perceptions, and past experiences, projecting our meaningful, lived world around us.
Preview of the Next Lesson:
Having established the concepts of the lived body, the body schema, and motor intentionality, we are now equipped to analyze one of Merleau-Ponty's most famous case studies. In the next lesson, we will examine the phenomenon of the phantom limb and see how he uses it as powerful evidence for his claim that the lived body takes primacy over the objective body.