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Lesson 26

Experts and Epistemic Authority

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Introduction

Hello again. In our last lesson, we established the core idea of social epistemology: our knowledge is not built in isolation but is deeply dependent on others. We rely on a vast social network for most of what we believe, from historical facts to scientific discoveries.

Today, we will delve into one of the most practical and crucial aspects of this social dependence: the role of experts and epistemic authority. In a world of specialized information, we are all "novices" on most topics. This creates a fundamental challenge: how can we, as non-experts, rationally decide who to trust? This lesson will provide you with a philosophical toolkit for analyzing the authority of experts and making justified choices about what to believe.


Part 1: The Necessity of Trust

Before we analyze how to choose between experts, it's worth asking why we should trust them at all. The very idea of deferring to an authority can seem at odds with the ideal of being an autonomous, critical thinker. However, social epistemologists argue that a certain kind of trust is not only practical but essential for knowledge.

Even in science, a field we often associate with rigorous skepticism, progress would be impossible without a baseline of trust.

Social Epistemology - Epistemology Video 31

Let's begin with a clip from the lecture by Victor Gijsbers that we saw last time. He explains how scientists must vulnerably rely on the data and reports of their peers to make any progress.

Please watch from 8:26 to 13:41. Pay close attention to his explanation of John Greco's concept of 'vulnerable reliance' and how it applies to the practice of science.

This "vulnerable reliance" is a form of trust that isn't based on having first-hand proof that the other person is right. Instead, it's a foundational trust in their competence and sincerity. Philosopher Linda Zagzebski argues this is deeply rational. Her reasoning starts with the fact that you must trust your own cognitive faculties (your perception, memory, reason) to function at all. From there, consistency demands that you extend a similar trust to others, who possess similar faculties. This initial trust is the gateway to accepting others as epistemic authorities.


Part 2: What is an Expert? What is Authority?

To tackle the problem of choosing whom to trust, we first need to clarify our terms. What does it mean to be an expert, and what does it mean to treat someone as an authority?

Defining Expertise

Philosopher Alvin Goldman, a leading figure in social epistemology, offers a definition tied directly to the goal of knowledge: truth.

An expert in a given domain is someone who:

  1. Has more true beliefs (and fewer false beliefs) about that domain than the vast majority of people.
  2. Possesses the skills and methods to deploy this knowledge to form true beliefs about new questions within that domain.

Essentially, an expert has both a superior database of facts and a superior ability to reason with them to find true answers.

The Novice/Expert Problem

This definition leads directly to our central puzzle, which Goldman calls the "novice/expert problem".

Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?

Let's read a short section from Alvin Goldman's paper, 'Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?'. This will help formalize the challenge we're addressing.

Please read the section titled '2. The Novice/Expert Problem vs. the Expert/Expert Problem'. It starts around page 88. Focus on how Goldman defines a 'novice' and why a novice cannot use their own opinions in the expert's domain to judge the expert.

As Goldman explains, the core of the problem is that you, as the novice, are by definition not in a position to directly check if the expert's conclusion is true. If you could, you wouldn't need the expert. So, how can you make a justified choice between two experts who disagree?

Defining Epistemic Authority

When you defer to an expert, you aren't just adding their opinion to your own; you are often letting their judgment replace yours. This is the core of epistemic authority.

Review of Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and ...

This idea is explored in Linda Zagzebski's book 'Epistemic Authority'. A review of her book clearly explains her model, which is based on political authority.

Please read the section titled 'The third stage...'. It's the fourth paragraph in the review. Focus on the definitions of 'Preemption' and 'Content-independence'.

The concept of preemption is key: you adopt the authority's belief instead of trying to figure it out for yourself based on your own, more limited, reasons. You are justified in doing this, Zagzebski argues, when you conscientiously judge that you are more likely to get the right answer by believing the authority than by relying on your own investigation.


Part 3: A Toolkit for Evaluating Experts

If you can't evaluate an expert's claims directly, you must rely on indirect evidence. Alvin Goldman's paper provides an excellent framework by outlining five sources of evidence a novice can use to assess the credibility of competing experts.

Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?

Let's turn back to Goldman's paper. He provides a list of five potential sources of evidence.

Please read the list of five sources (A-E) at the beginning of Section 3, 'Argument-Based Evidence'. We will use this list to structure our analysis.

Let's walk through these five sources:

(A) Arguments Presented by the Experts
Even if you don't understand the technical details, you can observe the dialectical performance. Does one expert consistently offer rebuttals to the other's points, while the other expert seems stumped or evasive? This "dialectical superiority" can be an indicator of greater expertise, though it's not foolproof—a skilled debater could appear more knowledgeable than they are.

(B) Agreement from Other Experts
This is the "numbers game" or appeal to consensus. If 99% of climate scientists agree on a conclusion, it is rational for a novice to side with the consensus. However, Goldman cautions that the numbers only matter if the experts are conditionally independent. If a large group of "experts" are simply echoing a single leader or an uncritical dogma (the "guru and slavish followers" example), then their numbers add no extra weight.

(C) Appraisals by "Meta-Experts" and Credentials
This is related to consensus. We rely on the judgment of other authorities (meta-experts) who grant credentials like PhDs, medical licenses, and professorships. These act as signals of an expert's training and competence, certified by others in the field.

(D) Evidence of Interests and Biases
This is a crucial and often accessible piece of evidence. Does an expert have a financial stake in the outcome? A strong political bias? As Goldman notes, a study on a new drug funded by the pharmaceutical company that makes it might be less trustworthy than one funded by a neutral non-profit.

(E) Past Track Records
Goldman argues this is potentially the most reliable source of evidence for a novice.

Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?

Let's read Goldman's explanation of how a novice can use an expert's track record without becoming an expert themselves.

Please read the first three paragraphs of Section 6, 'Using Past Track Records'. Focus on the distinction between 'esoteric' and 'exoteric' statements and how a statement can change from one to the other over time.

The key idea is that experts make predictions or claims about matters that are esoteric (inaccessible to novices) at the time, but which later become exoteric (easily verifiable by anyone). An astronomer predicts an eclipse years in advance; an engineer claims a bridge design will hold a certain weight; a doctor predicts a specific treatment will cure a disease. When you can later see with your own eyes that they were right, you gain strong evidence of their genuine expertise.

Test your understanding!

Imagine two financial advisors offer conflicting advice on a hot new stock. Advisor A has a fancy degree and is very charismatic in interviews. Advisor B is less polished but can show you a portfolio of past predictions about companies in that sector, many of which were initially surprising but turned out to be correct. According to Goldman's framework, why might you be more justified in trusting Advisor B, even if Advisor A seems more persuasive?

Show answer

According to Goldman's framework, Advisor B provides evidence from a past track record (E). Their past correct predictions were esoteric at the time (no one knew for sure if they were right) but have since become exoteric (we can now see they were). This is a strong indicator of genuine expertise. Advisor A's credentials (C) and polished arguments (A) are also relevant evidence, but the track record is often considered more powerful because it directly demonstrates an ability to get things right, while charisma can be misleading.


Conclusion

Navigating a world of expert claims is a central challenge of modern life. While the "novice/expert problem" shows that we can never be 100% certain when deferring to authority, it is far from a hopeless situation.

Key Takeaways:

  • Rationally trusting experts is essential for acquiring knowledge in a complex world.
  • The novice/expert problem is the challenge of choosing which expert to trust when you can't directly evaluate their claims.
  • You can make a justified choice by using indirect evidence:
    • The quality of their arguments.
    • The consensus of other independent experts.
    • Their credentials and appraisals by meta-experts.
    • Their potential biases and interests.
    • Most powerfully, their past track record of being correct.
  • Theories of epistemic authority, like Zagzebski's, have also been applied to analyze the role of authority in moral and religious life, a topic that connects directly to your interests in theology and how knowledge is handled in religious traditions.

Preview of the Next Lesson:
We've looked at how to evaluate individual sources of information. But what happens when these sources form vast networks? In our next lesson, we will explore a pressing topic in social epistemology: how knowledge and misinformation spread through social and testimony networks. We'll examine concepts like echo chambers and filter bubbles to understand the systems that shape our collective beliefs.