Contextualism in Linguistics

Introduction

In our last lesson, we outlined the powerful and logical structure of global skeptical arguments like the "Brain in a Vat." We saw that these arguments are designed to be valid, with premises that are very difficult to deny. This left us with a troubling question: are we forced to accept that we know almost nothing about the world around us?

Today, we will examine one of the most creative and influential contemporary responses to skepticism: contextualism. Instead of trying to prove that you're not a brain in a vat, contextualism takes a different route. It argues that the entire problem arises from a misunderstanding of how the word "know" works in our language.

Our goal is to describe how contextualism makes knowledge claims dependent on the conversational context. By the end of this lesson, you'll understand how this linguistic approach attempts to disarm the skeptic's argument, preserving our everyday knowledge while still acknowledging the skeptic's point.

Part 1: The Core Idea of Contextualism

Let's start with a simple observation about language. The meaning of many words we use depends on the context in which we say them.

Consider the word "tall." If a seven-year-old says, "My dad is tall," he's probably right. But if that same dad, who is 5'11", tries out for a professional basketball team, the coach might say, "Sorry, you're not tall enough."

Who is right? The child or the coach? The contextualist answer is: both of them. In the context of a family, 5'11" is tall. In the context of professional basketball, it isn't. The standard for what counts as "tall" has shifted.

The central claim of epistemic contextualism is that the word "know" works in the same way. What it takes to truthfully say "I know" changes from one context to another. To get a feel for this, let's watch a short video clip that introduces this core concept.

This is the foundational move of contextualism: proposing that the standards for knowledge aren't fixed. They can be lower in some situations and higher in others.

Part 2: How Contextualism Responds to Skepticism

Now, let's apply this idea to the skeptical arguments we discussed in the last lesson. The contextualist argues that there are at least two different contexts we need to consider:

1. The Ordinary Context: This is your everyday life. When you're talking with friends, making plans, or navigating the world, the standards for knowledge are set at a reasonable, practical level. In this context, to know you have hands, you just need to be able to rule out ordinary, "relevant alternatives" like wearing mittens or having them in your pockets. The possibility that you're a brain in a vat is not a relevant alternative in this context. It's just too far-fetched.

2. The Skeptical Context: This is the context you enter when you start doing philosophy or talking to a skeptic. In this conversation, the skeptic deliberately makes bizarre possibilities—like the Evil Demon or the Brain in a Vat—relevant. By bringing them up, the skeptic raises the standards for knowledge. To count as "knowing" in this new, high-standards context, you would have to be able to rule out that you're a brain in a vat.

Since you can't rule out the BIV scenario, the skeptic is correct to say that in that specific context, you don't know you have hands.

The "solution" here is subtle. Contextualism doesn't prove the skeptic wrong. Instead, it limits the damage. The skeptic's conclusion that "you don't know" is only true within the artificial, high-standards context they have created. It doesn't affect the truth of your claim "I know" back in the ordinary context.

The next segment of the video explains this move in more detail, using the dream argument as an example.

Part 3: What Changes the Context? The Role of "Stakes"

So, what moves the standards for knowledge up or down? As the video mentioned, one way is for a skeptic to simply bring up a skeptical hypothesis. Another crucial factor is how much is at stake. When the practical consequences of being wrong are high, the standards for knowing go up automatically.

The philosopher Stuart Cohen developed a famous example to illustrate this, involving an airport.

This airport case is a powerful piece of evidence for contextualism because it shows that we already treat "know" as context-sensitive in everyday life, even when no philosophical skeptic is involved.

Conclusion: The Power and Limits of Contextualism

Contextualism offers an elegant way out of the skeptical paradox. It allows us to be right when we claim to know things in our daily lives, while also granting that the skeptic is right within their peculiar conversational game.

As leading contextualist Keith DeRose puts it, the skeptic raises the standards for knowledge to a level that is "absolute" or infallible. When we realize we can't meet that superhuman standard, the distress is minimal—like the distress of realizing you're not omnipotent. Knowing by ordinary standards is good enough for ordinary life.

So, is contextualism the final answer? Some critics argue that it's a theory about language, not knowledge itself, and so it sidesteps the real philosophical issue. However, by showing how the skeptic's argument can be seen as a "trick of language," contextualists argue they take most of the bite out of the skeptical threat.

Key Takeaways:

• Contextualism is the theory that the word "know" is context-sensitive.
• The standards for what counts as knowledge shift depending on the conversational context.
• Factors like mentioning a skeptical hypothesis or raising the practical stakes can raise the standards for knowledge.
• This view "solves" the skeptical problem by showing that the skeptic's high standards apply only in a special philosophical context and do not undermine our knowledge claims in ordinary contexts.

Preview of the Next Lesson:
Contextualism offers a sophisticated, linguistic way to handle skepticism. But what if we want to confront the skeptic more directly? In our next lesson, we'll explore a very different kind of response from the philosopher G.E. Moore, who famously argued that the skeptic's premises are far less certain than the simple, common-sense beliefs they try to attack.