US, USSR, Cuba Stakeholders: Power/Interest Grid to 1962

The Power/Interest Grid: A Tool for Analysis

Before we identify the players, let's look at the tool we'll be using. A Power/Interest grid helps to categorize stakeholders based on two key dimensions: their level of power (their ability to influence the outcome) and their level of interest (how much the outcome will affect them).

Our goal today is to populate a similar grid for the Cuban Missile Crisis. This will move us beyond seeing the crisis as just "USA vs. USSR" and reveal the complex internal dynamics at play.

The Three National Leaders

At the apex of the crisis were the three national leaders, whose decisions would determine the fate of the world. Their personal histories, political pressures, and strategic goals were the driving force of the confrontation.

To begin, let's get a brief overview of the key players and their primary motivations for entering this high-stakes game.

As the video explains, Khrushchev's interests were multiple:

• Strategic Power: To correct the "missile gap" and achieve nuclear parity with the US.
• Geopolitical Leverage: To use the missiles as a bargaining chip, potentially over Berlin.
• Alliance Politics: To defend his Cuban ally from a potential US invasion.

Castro's interest was more singular and existential:

• Regime Survival: To deter another US-backed invasion like the failed Bay of Pigs operation and secure the future of his revolution.

Kennedy's interests were largely reactive, shaped by the doctrines we discussed in the last lesson:

• Upholding Containment: To prevent a Soviet offensive base in the Western Hemisphere.
• Credibility: To demonstrate American resolve to both allies and adversaries, especially after the Bay of Pigs and with ongoing tensions in Berlin.

These three men clearly fall into the High Power, High Interest quadrant of our grid. However, they were not acting in a vacuum. Let's delve into the circles of advisors and institutions that shaped their decisions.

Deep Dive 1: The US Stakeholders - ExComm

Upon learning of the missiles on October 16, 1962, President Kennedy immediately convened a select group of his most senior advisors. This group, which came to be known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), was the central forum for debate and decision-making on the American side. It was not a monolithic body; it was a collection of powerful individuals with different roles, perspectives, and recommendations.

The next video gives a fantastic breakdown of the key members of ExComm and their initial stances. As you watch, think about where each individual might fall on the Power/Interest grid.

As you saw, ExComm was sharply divided. We can broadly identify two main factions:

• The 'Hawks': This group, which initially included the Joint Chiefs of Staff (led by Gen. Maxwell Taylor), CIA Director John McCone, and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, advocated for immediate, decisive military action, such as an airstrike or a full-scale invasion. Their primary interest was the complete and swift elimination of the military threat. Their power was significant, representing the entire military and intelligence apparatus of the US government.
• The 'Doves': This group, which included Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, argued for a more measured approach to avoid uncontrollable escalation. They were more focused on the diplomatic and political risks. They eventually coalesced around the idea of a naval "quarantine." The President's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, was initially a hardliner on Cuba but became a key proponent of avoiding a surprise attack, framing it as morally analogous to Pearl Harbor.

These factions were not static. Individuals' positions evolved throughout the 13 days, a dynamic we will explore further in later lessons. For now, it's clear that within the US government, there were multiple powerful stakeholders with competing interests.

Deep Dive 2: Soviet and Cuban Stakeholders

Understanding the Soviet and Cuban side is more challenging due to the closed nature of their political systems. However, declassified documents and post-Cold War conferences have shed significant light on their internal dynamics.

This conversation reveals several critical points for our stakeholder analysis:

• The Soviet Inner Circle was tiny: According to KGB veteran Nikolai Leonov, only six people in the Soviet leadership initially knew of the plan. This extreme secrecy meant the decision was not fully "staffed out" or analyzed, increasing the risk of miscalculation. The interest was concentrated, but the analytical power was limited.
• Khrushchev's Gamble: The Soviets confirm that Khrushchev was "hoping" Kennedy would "swallow some missiles," seeing it as a prudent, not weak, choice. This confirms his high-risk, high-reward brinkmanship strategy.
• Castro's High Interest, Low Power: The most striking revelations concern Fidel Castro. Leonov recounts Castro's cable urging Khrushchev to launch a preemptive nuclear strike on the US if Cuba were invaded, fully accepting that Cuba would be destroyed in the process. This demonstrates the absolute peak of "High Interest." However, the final decision to withdraw the missiles was made by Khrushchev without even consulting Castro.

The following primary source document—a report from the Czechoslovak ambassador in Havana—vividly captures the Cuban leadership's reaction to being sidelined. Your background in history and government work will give you an appreciation for the raw intelligence value of such a document.

This telegram is a perfect illustration of the gap between interest and power. No one had a higher interest in the outcome than Castro, yet he was reduced to hearing the fate of his country announced on the radio. He was a key stakeholder, but not a key decision-maker in the final act.

Activity: Mapping the Stakeholders

Now, let's sketch out the Power/Interest grid based on our analysis.

This grid is a simplified model, but it clarifies the complex political landscape. The political scientist Graham Allison developed a more sophisticated version of this idea in his "Governmental Politics Model" (Model III), which argues that government actions are best understood not as choices of a unified state, but as the political resultants of bargaining among individual players. The Power/Interest grid is a practical tool for applying this powerful insight.

Conclusion

Today we moved from the grand strategy of the Cold War to the granular politics of crisis management.

Key Takeaways:

• The crisis involved a complex web of stakeholders, not just two monolithic superpowers.
• A Power/Interest grid is a valuable framework for dissecting who holds influence and who is most affected in a policy crisis.
• The US ExComm was deeply divided between 'hawks' favouring military force and 'doves' urging diplomatic caution.
• Fidel Castro, despite having the most to lose, ultimately had very little power over the final superpower agreement, highlighting the crucial distinction between interest and power.

In our next lesson, we will build directly on our analysis of ExComm. We will appraise the initial US response options discussed by ExComm by listing the primary pros, cons, and potential risks of each. We have now met the people in the room; next, we will analyze the choices they put on the table.