Last time, qiyas offered a way to extend an established ruling to a new case by identifying a shared effective cause. But a jurist might justify a conclusion in other ways. This lesson examines two of them: ijma, an appeal to juristic agreement, and maslaha, reasoning about benefit or public interest.
The distinction matters when you encounter a claim that “Islamic law requires” a particular rule. That claim might rest on a text, an analogy, an asserted consensus, or an argument about what would protect people’s interests. Those are not interchangeable reasons, and jurists disagree about when some of them carry authority.
Ijma: what agreement is being claimed?
Ijma is commonly translated as consensus. In a classical juristic definition, it means agreement by qualified jurists on a legal ruling in a particular period after the Prophet’s death. It is not simply a vote by the public, a majority preference, or the fact that several scholars give the same answer. An appeal to ijma asks who was qualified to participate, whose agreement counts, what precise ruling they agreed on, and what evidence supports the claim.
Ijma' (Consensus of Legal Opinion
Read Ijma' (Consensus of Legal Opinion) for its working definition and its distinction between expressed agreement and silence.
In “Definition” and “Conditions for the validity of ijma’,” begin at the explanation of the literal meaning and read the definition and conditions through condition 7, which requires an evidentiary basis. Then, under “Types of Ijma’,” read the two types, from the definition of explicit ijma’ through the description of silent or tacit ijma’. Focus on the difference between stating an opinion and merely not objecting to one.
A mujtahid is a jurist qualified to undertake independent legal reasoning. On the definition in the reading, explicit ijma would require the relevant qualified jurists to express the same legal position. They need not all have reached it by identical reasoning, but the claim concerns agreement on a ruling—not just shared concern about a problem. The reading also requires a sanad, an evidentiary basis for that agreement. Consensus is therefore not presented as a way to invent a rule without reference to other legal evidence.
This makes the scope of a consensus claim crucial. “Many jurists endorsed this” may describe an influential majority position; it does not by itself establish unanimity. “The jurists agreed” is also incomplete if it leaves unspecified which jurists, in which period, and on which formulation of the ruling. A narrow agreement might be real even when scholars disagree on a broader question. Conversely, documented disagreement on the very ruling claimed as unanimous would challenge the claim of ijma under this definition.
Why invoke ijma at all? In many Sunni theories of law, a properly established consensus has special authority: it is treated not merely as one more jurist’s opinion, but as a reason later jurists should not reopen the settled ruling. That force depends on establishing that the relevant consensus actually occurred. The historical and methodological difficulty of doing so is one reason to distinguish a confident claim of consensus from the evidence for it.
Silence is not an uncontroversial vote
The reading distinguishes explicit ijma from silent or tacit ijma: some jurists state a ruling, other qualified jurists learn of it, and no objection is recorded. Whether that silence establishes agreement is itself disputed. A person might remain silent because they agree, but also because they have not reached a view, lack an opportunity to object, or face pressure not to speak.
Ijma' (Consensus of Legal Opinion
Return to Ijma' (Consensus of Legal Opinion) to see how an apparent agreement can be assessed differently.
Find the subsection “The position of silent ijma’.” Begin with its statement that jurists differ, then read the opposing views through the end of the second view’s argument. The presentation associates different positions with jurists in several schools; focus on why one side rejects silence as evidence of consent while the other accepts it under conditions, rather than treating each school label as a description of every member’s view.
The disagreement is not about whether explicit agreement and silence look different. Both sides can see that they do. It concerns what silence warrants us in concluding. If it cannot reliably establish assent, the asserted consensus fails. If silence counts as assent when informed jurists had a genuine opportunity to object, a jurist might give the resulting agreement legal weight. The reading presents strong versions of both positions; it does not settle the dispute for every juristic tradition.
There is a wider question of scope as well. Legal theorists have differed over whose agreement is authoritative: for example, some discussions focus on the Prophet’s Companions, while others discuss qualified jurists of a later period. Sunni and Shia accounts of religious authority also differ. For now, the useful habit is to name the claimed group rather than treating “consensus” as a self-explanatory label.
Maslaha: reasoning from benefit under legal constraints
Maslaha means benefit or interest. In legal reasoning, it concerns protecting interests that jurists regard as relevant to the purposes of Islamic guidance, rather than merely choosing whatever seems convenient. The more specific expression maslaha mursala is often used when a proposed measure addresses an interest without a particular text expressly prescribing or rejecting that measure. Jurists dispute how far such reasoning can independently justify a legal conclusion.
Islamic Jurisprudence [FIQH] - Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance
Read the “Maslaha al Mursalah” portion of the Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance’s Islamic Jurisprudence [FIQH], followed by its brief account of how choices about legal sources contribute to disagreement.
Under “MASLAHA AL MURSALAH,” start with the definition and read the definition and dispute through the paragraph following categories A–C. Then find “REASONS FOR DIFFERENCES OF OPINIONS AMONG THE MUJTAHIDEEN.” Under “Differences in the Legislative Sources,” read items D and E, from the differing sources. Notice that the article describes choices about both ijma and maslaha as sources of disagreement. Its account reflects a particular approach; do not read its list of accepted sources as a definition shared by every jurist.
The important boundary is between considering benefit within an established ruling and claiming that benefit justifies a ruling where no specific text settles the proposed measure. A measure cannot ordinarily be defended as maslaha mursala merely by saying it would be useful if it contradicts a clear governing prohibition. At the other end, a jurist need not find a text naming every new administrative procedure before considering whether it serves a legitimate interest. The difficult cases lie between these points: how to identify a genuine interest, connect it to broader legal principles, and decide whether that connection is sufficient authority.
The article groups interests under several headings and identifies disagreement about adopting benefit where the Quran and Sunnah give no ruling on the particular action. Read that distinction carefully: no text specifying the particular measure does not mean no relevant textual principles at all. Nor does the absence of an express prohibition automatically prove that every claimed public benefit is an authoritative legal reason. Different jurists place different conditions on such reasoning, and some reject its use as an independent justification.
Two justifications applied to one proposal
Consider a hypothetical proposal for an official digital registry of marriage contracts. Its advocates argue that reliable records could help spouses establish their rights and reduce disputes. Assume no specific text settles whether this exact digital procedure should be used, and set aside, for the example, any other directly applicable ruling.
A jurist making a maslaha argument would identify the interests the registry serves, assess whether the measure genuinely serves them, and check its consistency with relevant texts and legal principles. The proposed justification is the measure’s legally relevant benefit, subject to those checks. The argument alone does not establish that every jurist would approve the registry, that it must be mandatory, or that a state has enacted it.
Now imagine someone instead says, “This is required by ijma.” Evidence that several jurists recommended the registry would not suffice. The claimant would need to specify the precise legal ruling supposedly agreed upon—approval, recommendation, or obligation are different claims—and show that the qualified group recognized by their theory agreed to it. We are not asserting that any such consensus exists in this hypothetical case. We are testing what evidence the word ijma would demand.
The two forms of reasoning need not be rivals. Jurists could conceivably agree on a measure because they judge it beneficial on sound legal grounds. In that situation, maslaha describes part of why they favor it; an established ijma would add a claim about who agreed and what authority their agreement carries. Neither should be confused with a statute. A state may adopt a registry rule, but its enforceability through state institutions does not, by itself, prove a juristic consensus or settle the religious argument for it.
Placed beside the previous lesson, the contrast is sharp. Qiyas asks whether a new case shares the effective cause of an established ruling. Maslaha asks whether an interest can justify a proposed measure under the applicable legal constraints. Ijma asks whether the relevant qualified jurists agreed on a ruling, and what follows from that agreement. A jurist may consider more than one kind of argument, but each has its own burden of explanation.
Conclusion
Ijma is a claim about legally significant agreement; maslaha is a justification based on a legally relevant benefit. For ijma, look for the participants, the exact ruling, the evidence of agreement, and the theory that gives it authority. For maslaha, look for the interest being protected, the measure’s connection to that interest, and the limits imposed by texts and other legal principles. The authority of both is debated—particularly what counts as consensus and when public interest can independently support a ruling.
The next module turns from methods of reasoning to legal schools and religious authority. It will show how jurists can share an interpretive tradition while still disagreeing about particular conclusions.