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Lesson 11

Estimating Hormuz Bypass Capacity via East–West and Fujairah Pipelines

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Hello. This module looks at what can happen when movement through Hormuz is disrupted: which routes remain available, how shipping and energy costs respond, and how to judge claims about the scale of an interruption. Here, the focus is narrower and physical. You will use dated capacity figures to estimate how much crude oil Saudi Arabia and the UAE might send to export ports outside the strait—and why that does not give tankers already loading inside the Persian Gulf a sea detour.

Allow about 40 minutes for the map, two short readings, and the worked estimate.


A bypass moves the loading point, not the strait

The map shows two pipelines that connect oil-producing areas to ports beyond Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s East–West crude pipeline runs to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi crude pipeline runs to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. A tanker loading at either port can depart without sailing through Hormuz.

IEA map of the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding coasts. The red route reaches Yanbu on the Red Sea; the green route reaches Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Both crude-oil export routes move oil to a loading port outside the strait. The map also marks other oil and gas installations that should not be mistaken for equivalent crude-oil bypasses.

The distinction is between rerouting oil before it reaches a ship and rerouting a ship after it loads. Imagine a tanker taking on crude at a port inside the Persian Gulf. Its cargo is already aboard, and the gulf’s sea exit is the Strait of Hormuz. Sailing along another part of the gulf coast will not get it to the open ocean without passing through the strait. By contrast, oil delivered overland to Yanbu or Fujairah can be loaded onto a different tanker outside the chokepoint.

This is why a pipeline’s location matters as much as its capacity. These are routes for particular supplies connected to Saudi and UAE infrastructure, not general-purpose exits for every exporter’s oil. The two lines do not, simply by existing, provide an equivalent export route for a cargo loaded in Iraq or Kuwait.



Estimate spare capacity, not total capacity

Pipeline capacity is the amount a line can carry under specified conditions. For a disruption estimate, the more useful quantity is spare capacity: how much additional oil could move through it beyond its existing use. In simple terms,

Even that subtraction is only a starting point. Oil must be available at the pipeline’s inlet, and the receiving port must be able to handle and load the additional volume.

Read the IEA’s Strait of Hormuz page for its early-2026 estimates. Keep the headline estimate separate from the capacities stated for each line.

Strait of Hormuz - About - IEA

The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes the two operating crude-oil bypasses and estimates how much extra flow they might carry. Read this before doing the arithmetic below.

In “Alternative export routes,” read the capacity discussion, starting with the opening assessment and continuing through the Saudi Arabia paragraph. Note the UAE line’s reported capacity and existing exports, then distinguish the Saudi line’s design capacity from its higher reported—but not sustainably tested—capacity. In the same section, find “Iran – the Jask oil terminal” and read the Jask assessment to see why a reported pipeline capacity need not count as a working alternative.

The IEA expresses flow in million barrels per day, abbreviated mb/d. Its figures support this estimate:

Route Capacity described by the IEA Existing use described by the IEA Indicative extra flow
Saudi East–West crude pipeline 5 mb/d design capacity; 7 mb/d reported higher capacity About 2 mb/d as of early 2026 About 3–5 mb/d, conditional on operations and west-coast export capacity
UAE pipeline to Fujairah Close to 1.8 mb/d reported current capacity About 1.1 mb/d exported through it Up to 0.7 mb/d

For Saudi Arabia, the lower end comes from mb/d. Using the reported higher capacity gives mb/d, but the IEA cautions that sustained flow at 7 mb/d has not been tested. For the UAE, mb/d is an upper-end estimate of additional room.

Adding those rounded line-item figures yields 3.7–5.7 mb/d. The IEA’s overall estimate of available alternative-route capacity is slightly lower: 3.5–5.5 mb/d. Its page does not provide a line-by-line reconciliation of that difference, so do not present the arithmetic sum as though it were the agency’s headline estimate. The defensible conclusion is that these routes offer several million barrels per day of potential additional crude-oil capacity, with substantial operational qualifications—not that they can replace all Hormuz traffic.



Why estimates have dates

A capacity number is not timeless. Pipelines can be expanded, reported ratings can differ from demonstrated sustained performance, and existing use changes the room left over. A useful comparison comes from an earlier U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) assessment.

2024 World Oil Transit Chokepoints - U.S. Energy Information ...

The EIA’s June 2024 assessment gives an older estimate of effective unused bypass capacity. Read it as a dated assessment, not as a competing measurement made under identical conditions.

Under “Strait of Hormuz,” on p. 7, find the bullet beginning “Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have operating crude oil pipelines.” Read the pipeline bullet through its estimate of effective unused capacity. Focus on the difference between a line’s stated maximum and the amount the EIA judged available for additional traffic.

The EIA estimated around 2.6 mb/d of effective unused capacity in its June 2024 report. The IEA’s early-2026 estimate is 3.5–5.5 mb/d. They are estimates from different dates, using stated capacities and assessments of usability that should not be silently combined. In particular, the later IEA account reports a higher current capacity for the UAE line and discusses a reported increase in Saudi capacity while warning that sustained use at the higher level remains untested. The figures should not be read as proof that an extra 0.9–2.9 mb/d was demonstrated in operation between the two reports.

Capacity also has to be matched to the right commodity. The map includes a Saudi natural gas liquids line alongside the East–West crude route; it is not extra spare crude capacity. Likewise, the existence of a pipeline and terminal near Jask does not make them a currently viable substitute: the IEA says that route effectively remains non-operational.

The resulting estimate has two separate limits:

  1. Throughput limit: Existing use leaves only part of each operating crude line available, and loading facilities and sustained operating conditions may constrain that part further.
  2. Geographic limit: The pipelines connect particular oil supplies to ports outside Hormuz. They do not create a sea passage around the strait for ships loading inside the Persian Gulf.


What the estimate tells you

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have operating crude pipelines that can reduce reliance on Hormuz by moving some oil overland to Yanbu and Fujairah. Using the IEA’s early-2026 assessment, their combined potential additional capacity is approximately 3.5–5.5 mb/d, not the sum of the pipelines’ full rated capacities and not a guarantee of sustained exports. A tanker already loaded inside the Persian Gulf has no comparable maritime bypass.

The next lesson follows a different consequence of a security incident: shipping insurance, freight costs, and energy prices can rise before a physical shortage appears.