Hello. The previous lesson established that Iranian forces diverted and detained Stena Impero in 2019, but that the seizure of one tanker did not establish a closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Tanker War offered another contrast: ships came under attack, yet commercial traffic did not simply cease.
This lesson gives you a way to classify such events by what happened to vessels. You will distinguish harassment, selective seizure, attack-related interruption and sustained closure, then identify the evidence needed before using each label. Allow about 40 minutes, including the short readings and video segments.
Start with the movement, not the announcement
A statement that a strait “will be closed” is a claim about intentions or authority. A statement that ships “cannot get through” is a claim about observed traffic. They require different evidence. The distinction matters because a threat may prompt caution without stopping passage, while an attack near the strait may cause ships to wait even if no one has physically blocked a shipping lane.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) draws a useful contrast between outright closure and measures that harass traffic without shutting it all down. Its report also notes that harassment can increase uncertainty and shipping costs. For this lesson, concentrate on the report’s descriptions of the possible disruptions, rather than treating its assessment of what was likely at the time as a prediction for every future crisis.
Iran's Threats, the Strait of Hormuz, and Oil Markets: In Brief
Read the Congressional Research Service report to establish the difference between interference with traffic and an outright closure.
On printed page 5, find “Iranian Options Regarding the Strait.” Under “Outright Closure,” read the closure discussion, beginning with “An outright closure” and ending with “not likely to be prolonged.” Then, under “Harassment and/or Infrastructure Damage,” read the harassment discussion, from “Iran could harass tanker traffic” through “consequently higher oil prices.” Focus on the different effects each scenario could have on continuing passage.
A useful classification has two parts. First, describe the event affecting ships: an approach, a detention, an attack or a widespread halt. Second, describe its reach: one vessel, ships of a particular flag, one direction of travel, or traffic across the strait. A dramatic event involving one ship can have wide consequences, but the consequences must be observed rather than assumed.
Four operational categories
Harassment is interference that falls short of taking custody of a ship or inflicting an attack. Repeated close approaches, threatening hails or navigation-signal interference may cause a vessel to slow, alter course, request an escort or delay its transit. Other vessels may continue to pass. A political statement alone is not evidence that a ship was harassed; look for an encounter or a reported effect on navigation.
Selective seizure means particular vessels are boarded, detained or compelled to divert. The defining observation is that those ships no longer continue their intended voyages. Stena Impero fits this category: its diversion and detention were documented, while the previous lesson did not establish a halt to all strait traffic. A seizure can also deter other operators, but their subsequent choices are a separate effect to document.
Attack-related interruption describes movement affected by an attack or a credible, specific attack hazard. A damaged ship may stop, while others wait offshore, turn back or suspend departures as crews assess the danger. The interruption may last hours or days, affect only some operators, and extend beyond the exact site of an attack. It does not require that every ship stop. Keep the location precise: an attack in the nearby Gulf of Oman, for example, is not automatically an attack inside the Strait of Hormuz.
Sustained closure is the strongest claim. In this lesson, it means that passage through the strait is effectively unavailable to commercial shipping across a substantial span of time, with a near-total halt in actual crossings—not merely a warning, a brief pause or a drop below normal traffic. Evidence would need to show the breadth and duration of the halt, including what happened in both directions. This is an operational description, not a judgment about whether anyone had legal authority to close the strait.
The categories describe different scales and can occur in sequence. An attack might initially interrupt several transits; if passage then became effectively unavailable to commercial ships for an extended period, the wider condition could be classified as sustained closure. Name both the initiating event and the observed condition instead of forcing them into one label.
What the maritime advisory can—and cannot—establish
A U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) advisory identifies several kinds of threats to merchant vessels, including boarding, mines, drone attacks and navigation or communication disruption. It covers a broad region, not just Hormuz. Read it as evidence of distinct mechanisms and documented incidents, not as evidence that all those mechanisms simultaneously stopped traffic through the strait.
Read MARAD’s “Issues and Specific Guidance” to compare what happens to a vessel during boarding, an attack and navigation interference.
In “2. Issues and Specific Guidance,” find “a) UAVs.” Read the attack account, from the sentence beginning “On July 30, 2021” through the description of bridge damage; note that this incident was in the Arabian Sea. Under “b) Iranian Boarding/Detention/Seizure,” read the boarding account, from “Multiple commercial vessels” through “Iranian territorial waters.” Under “c) Limpet Mines,” read the mine description, from its opening sentence through the list of places a device might be attached. Finally, under “f) Navigation or Communication Disruptions,” read the interference description, from “Vessels operating” through the reported false radio claims. Distinguish a hazard listed in an advisory from a measured change in strait crossings.
The image below makes one evidentiary limit vivid. It establishes that a tanker was on fire; it does not, on its own, establish the cause of the fire, who was responsible, how other vessels responded or whether Hormuz remained passable.

This is why a report of an explosion and a report of a closure should not be treated as interchangeable. The first concerns an event; the second concerns the resulting availability of a route to many ships.
How to establish the scale of a disruption
Classifying the event may be straightforward: a ship was detained or damaged. Classifying its effect on the route takes more care. Work through four observations:
- Identify the area. Was the vessel in the strait, elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, or on an approach such as the Gulf of Oman? An incident nearby can influence decisions at Hormuz, but its location should remain clear.
- Count crossings, not just ships visible on a map. Ships at anchor or waiting to enter are not transits. Compare observed crossings with a suitable normal period, separately for vessels entering and leaving the Gulf.
- Look for changes in intended voyages. Reports of delayed departures, turnarounds, diverted destinations or resumed sailings help explain what a fall in crossings means. A snapshot cannot establish how long a disruption lasted.
- State the limits of the record. Vessel-tracking displays can be incomplete, and navigation or communication interference can make a track unreliable. Combine traffic observations with port reports, operator statements and dated security notices where available.
The following video offers a practical demonstration of why reduced flow and full closure are different claims. Its traffic display is a snapshot of the episode being discussed, not a live picture of conditions today. Treat the host’s assessment of how difficult full closure would be as an assessment, not as proof that it could never happen.
Is the Strait of Hormuz Open? | What Impact Will This Have on Shipping? | Hormuz Data | US Sealift
Watch the traffic-display and closing-assessment segments of “Is the Strait of Hormuz Open? | What Impact Will This Have on Shipping? | Hormuz Data,” from What’s Going on With Shipping?. They contrast fewer observed movements with the much stronger claim of closure.
Watch the traffic view for the displayed reduction in commercial movements following the strikes discussed in the video. Notice what a short observation window can show and what it cannot establish about duration. Then watch the flow distinction, where the host distinguishes sharply diminished traffic from full closure. Keep that distinction even if you do not adopt the host’s forecast about what could happen next.
Traffic evidence also prevents an easy error in the opposite direction. If a few ships get through, the situation is not a near-total operational closure under the definition used here—but those passages do not mean that trade is unaffected. A major reduction in crossings can strand cargoes, delay deliveries and impose serious costs while the route remains technically usable.
Applying the labels without overstating them
Consider four hypothetical reports. In the first, several tankers report threatening approaches and slow down, while crossings continue near their usual level. The appropriate description is harassment with limited observed effect on throughput. In the second, one tanker is forced to an Iranian port while other ships continue to transit. That is a selective seizure, not a strait-wide closure.
In the third, an attack damages a vessel near the route. Operators pause departures, and crossings fall sharply for two days before recovering. That is an attack-related interruption, with its duration and scope stated alongside the label. In the fourth, reliable observations over an extended period show almost no commercial crossings in either direction, with vessels accumulating on both sides and no prompt resumption. That evidence could support a finding of sustained closure, regardless of whether the halt resulted from a physical barrier, persistent attack risk or operators’ inability to sail safely.
These descriptions leave room for mixed cases. A detained ship can be a selective seizure even as the resulting fear causes an interruption to other voyages. The disciplined account says which ships were seized, which other movements changed, and for how long. It does not promote a claim about all shipping from evidence about one ship.
Key takeaways
Classify a Hormuz disruption by observed vessel movements, geographic scope and duration. Harassment interferes with navigation without taking a ship; selective seizure removes particular ships from their intended voyages; attack-related interruption delays or reduces movements in response to damage or a specific hazard; sustained closure requires strong evidence that commercial passage was effectively unavailable over time. Announcements, images of damage and single traffic snapshots may be important evidence, but none independently proves that the strait closed.
The next module turns to alternatives. Once the amount and duration of interrupted traffic are clear, you can assess how much oil might use pipelines around Hormuz—and why a ship that must load inside the Persian Gulf cannot simply take another sea exit.