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Lesson 15

Evaluating Campaign-Finance Disclosure Under Exacting Scrutiny

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Last lesson showed that a super PAC’s report can identify a nonprofit intermediary without identifying everyone who funded it. A proposal to close that gap raises a different question: how much donor information may the government require an organization to disclose?

This lesson gives you a way to assess a proposed disclosure rule without treating it as either automatically valid because it promotes transparency or automatically invalid because it affects privacy. The governing idea is exacting scrutiny: the government needs an important interest, a substantial connection between that interest and the information demanded, and a rule narrowly tailored to that interest.


Why a disclosure rule raises a First Amendment question

Disclosure is not a ban on speaking or donating. Still, requiring an advocacy group to identify its supporters can affect freedom of association. Someone willing to support a cause privately may be less willing to do so if that support must be revealed to the government or the public.

The setting matters. In Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, California required charities to give the state information about their major donors as part of a generally applicable filing requirement. The information was supposed to remain confidential; the case was not about an election-ad disclaimer or a public list of super PAC donors. Read the short account below to establish those facts before applying the Court’s reasoning to a campaign-finance proposal.

Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta | Oyez

Read Oyez’s case summary for the kind of donor information California sought and the First Amendment objection, then read its brief statement of the Court’s rule.

Under “Facts of the case,” read from the description of the state’s filing policy through the organizations’ claim that disclosure could deter support: the case facts Then read the summary passage beginning “Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy” through its conclusion about donors’ associational rights: the ruling Notice that the state’s intended confidentiality did not make the associational concern disappear.

That concern does not mean every disclosure requirement fails. Election-disclosure rules can serve interests that a broad charitable filing rule does not serve in the same way: helping voters evaluate election messages and revealing sources of election spending. The constitutional task is to examine the particular information required, from whom, for what purpose, and with what burden.



Exacting scrutiny: a substantial connection and narrow tailoring

Under Bonta, a compelled donor-disclosure requirement subject to exacting scrutiny must have a substantial relation to a sufficiently important governmental interest. The Court also held that the requirement must be narrowly tailored to that interest. It need not be the least restrictive means: the government does not have to prove that no imaginable alternative could work. But it cannot demand far more sensitive information than its stated purpose reasonably calls for simply because collecting everything is convenient.

That distinction is central. A disclosure rule might yield some useful information and still have a poor fit if it sweeps in large numbers of people whose identities add little to the government’s purpose. Conversely, the existence of a less intrusive alternative does not, by itself, prove that a more extensive rule is unconstitutional.

The Court’s opinion supplies the reasoning behind this standard. Its charity-fraud example is worth reading as an example of how to test fit, not as a decision that election-related donor reporting is invalid.

19-251 Americans For Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (07/01/2021)

Read the Court’s own explanation of exacting scrutiny and why California’s across-the-board collection of charity donor lists failed it. Then read its short discussion of whether confidentiality eliminates the burden.

In the “Opinion of the Court,” printed pp. 12–15, start with the paragraph beginning “As explained, exacting scrutiny requires” and read through the discussion ending with the observation that the First Amendment’s objective is not efficiency: fit and alternatives Follow the Court’s comparison between the large amount of donor information collected and its demonstrated use in investigations, including its discussion of targeted requests. Then, on printed pp. 16–17 of the “Opinion of the Court,” read from the paragraph beginning “The Attorney General tries to downplay the burden” through the explanation that confidentiality can reduce, but not eliminate, the burden: confidential disclosure

California had an important interest in preventing charitable fraud. What failed was the fit: it collected major-donor information up front from tens of thousands of charities, while the record showed little use for that blanket collection in identifying wrongdoing. The Court considered whether information could instead be obtained when an investigation called for it. Its objection was not that fraud prevention was unimportant, nor that the state had failed to choose the single least intrusive method. It was that the state had not justified the breadth of its demand in light of its actual investigative need.

For an election rule, the analysis starts again with the election-specific interest and the rule’s actual design. Bonta does not erase the recognized case for campaign-finance disclosure. It does require attention to the people and information a proposed rule reaches, including donors with no meaningful connection to the election spending at issue.



A worked assessment of a proposed election-disclosure law

Suppose a state proposes this rule:

Any nonprofit advocacy organization that spends at least $1,000 on independent candidate-election ads during the 90 days before an election must publicly report the name and total contributions of every donor who gave it at least $200 in the preceding two years. It must also publish each individual donor’s residential address. The rule applies even if a donation was unrelated to the ads.

Begin by identifying what is compelled. The organization must publicly identify supporters, their contribution amounts, and individuals’ home addresses. Public posting poses a different burden from confidential filing with an agency, although Bonta makes clear that even confidential disclosure can burden association. This is a disclosure rule, not a ban on independent spending or a limit on candidate contributions; do not substitute the legal test for those restrictions.

Next, state the government’s interest as precisely as possible. The state could argue that voters should know who funds election advocacy and that reporting can help reveal efforts to conceal the sources of spending. Those are more pertinent to this proposal than the charity-fraud interest in Bonta. But naming an interest is only the beginning. How does this rule advance it? Reporting donors who financed the ads could inform voters. Reporting every donor to a multipurpose organization over two years is less clearly connected: some may have supported entirely different activities. And if the organization gave money to a super PAC but ran no ads itself, this particular rule would not necessarily reveal the earlier source discussed last lesson. Breadth and effectiveness are separate questions.

Finally, assess narrow tailoring. The $1,000 spending trigger, $200 donor threshold, two-year lookback, lack of any connection-to-ad requirement, and publication of residential addresses all need a reason grounded in the state’s aim. A small election-ad purchase could trigger public identification of many supporters whose gifts did not fund it. The state would have a stronger fit if it could explain why that sweep is necessary or substantially useful, rather than relying on the general claim that more information is always better.

Consider a narrower design for comparison: require reporting above a meaningful threshold of donors who designated funds for election ads, and publish names and amounts while collecting addresses confidentially if needed for enforcement. That design could reduce unrelated disclosures. It also presents a real difficulty for the state: designated gifts may not reveal who financed ads paid from a group’s general funds. Narrow tailoring requires a justified fit, not a reflexive preference for the smallest possible report. A court would weigh that tracing problem against the burden of the broader rule, using the law’s details and the evidence offered to support them.

On these stated facts, the blanket two-year list and public home addresses create serious tailoring objections. A narrower rule tied more closely to election spending would have a stronger defense. Neither conclusion can be converted into a definitive ruling without the full law, the government’s justification, and a factual record.



What to carry forward

Exacting scrutiny asks more than whether disclosure might be useful. It requires a sufficiently important interest, a substantial relationship between that interest and the information demanded, and narrow tailoring—though not proof that the rule is the least restrictive imaginable. Bonta illustrates why a broad donor-information dragnet can fail even when the government’s underlying aim is important.

The next lesson focuses on a more particular challenge: when evidence of threats, harassment, or reprisals may justify an as-applied exemption from a disclosure rule that otherwise remains in force.