Wittgenstein: From Picture to Use

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The freely available resources this lesson will direct you to.

Introduction

Hello! In our last module, we explored how W.V.O. Quine launched a powerful critique against the two central "dogmas" of logical positivism, proposing a holistic "web of belief" model in its place. Quine's work marked a major turning point, but he wasn't the only figure steering analytic philosophy in a new direction.

In this module, we turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein, arguably one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. Remarkably, he was the architect of two distinct and largely incompatible philosophies. His early work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was a primary inspiration for the very logical positivists Quine critiqued. His later work, the Philosophical Investigations, took a completely different path that came to define the "linguistic turn" in philosophy.

Today, we will address the learning outcome: Contrast Wittgenstein's later concept of 'meaning as use' with his earlier 'picture theory'. Understanding this dramatic shift within a single philosopher's life will not only illuminate the trajectory of analytic philosophy but also provide two powerful, competing frameworks for thinking about the relationship between language, thought, and reality.

To set the stage, let's watch a brief introduction to Wittgenstein's two philosophies.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy - John Searle & Bryan Magee (1987)

In this clip from a famous 1987 discussion, philosopher John Searle introduces the two major phases of Wittgenstein's work and their profound, yet different, impacts on philosophy.

Watch from 02:32 to 03:29. Notice the core features that both of his philosophies share, despite their incompatibility: a focus on language and a desire to draw the line between sense and nonsense.

1. The Early Wittgenstein: The Picture Theory of Meaning

Wittgenstein's first major work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), is a dense, aphoristic text that attempts to map the logical limits of language, and therefore, the world. It was heavily influenced by the work on logic by Frege and Russell, which we covered in a previous module. The central doctrine of the Tractatus is the picture theory of meaning.

The theory's core claim is that language represents reality by "picturing" it. A meaningful proposition functions like a picture of a possible state of affairs.

This works through a structural correspondence:

The world is the totality of facts.
Facts are existing states of affairs.
States of affairs are combinations of simple objects.
A proposition is composed of simple names.
Each name in the proposition corresponds to an object in the state of affairs.
The way the names are arranged in the proposition—its logical structure—mirrors the way the objects are arranged in the state of affairs.

Given your background in mathematics, you can think of this as a kind of isomorphism. For a proposition to be a picture of a fact, there must be a mapping between the elements of the proposition (names) and the elements of the fact (objects), and this mapping must preserve the structure.

Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Meaning — This diagram illustrates the core of the Picture Theory. A sentence, like "The cat is on the mat," corresponds to a thought, which in turn corresponds to a fact in the world. For the sentence to be true, the structure it depicts must match the structure of the fact that actually obtains in the world.

Let's watch a more detailed explanation.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy - John Searle & Bryan Magee (1987)

John Searle now explains the mechanics of the picture theory in more detail.

Watch from 03:49 to 07:27. Focus on how the arrangement of words in a sentence is thought to mirror the arrangement of objects in a fact, and how Wittgenstein handled logical constants like 'not'.

The stark implication of this theory is that the only meaningful statements are those that picture possible facts—the kind of statements found in the natural sciences. Anything that does not picture a state of affairs, such as statements about ethics, aesthetics, or metaphysics, falls outside the limits of language. They are, in Wittgenstein's view, strictly nonsense. This includes the propositions of the Tractatus itself, which he famously compared to a ladder that one must throw away after climbing it.

To explore this theory in more detail, let's turn to a written resource.

Wittgenstein on Meaning: From the Tractatus to the ...

The following article, "Wittgenstein on Meaning" by Christopher Hurtado, provides a clear summary of the picture theory and its metaphysical underpinnings.

Please read the section titled 'The Picture Theory of Meaning'. Focus on the roles of atomic facts, names, and the idea that the logical form must be shared between the proposition and the state of affairs it depicts.

2. The Later Wittgenstein: Meaning as Use

After publishing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein believed he had solved the main problems of philosophy. He abandoned the subject for years. However, he eventually returned, convinced that his earlier work was fundamentally mistaken. His posthumously published masterpiece, Philosophical Investigations (1953), presents a radically different view of language.

Wittgenstein came to see the rigid, unitary logic of the Tractatus as a "craving for generality" and a "contemptuous attitude towards the particular case." He abandoned the idea that all language must conform to a single function (picturing) and instead proposed that we look at how language actually works in our lives.

The new core idea is famously summarized in the slogan: "the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

Instead of the "picture" metaphor, Wittgenstein now uses the metaphor of "tools". Words are like tools in a toolbox. There are hammers, saws, screwdrivers, and rulers. It would be absurd to ask what the single, essential function of all tools is. They do different jobs. Likewise, it is absurd to think all words have the same job (naming objects). Their meaning is the work they do.

To understand this work, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language-games (Sprachspiele). Language is not one grand, unified game, but a vast collection of different activities, each with its own rules and purposes. For example:

Giving and obeying orders
Describing the appearance of an object
Reporting an event
Telling a joke
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying

The job of the philosopher is not to uncover a hidden logical structure, but to describe these various uses to dissolve philosophical confusion, which often arises when we take a word from one language-game and try to apply its rules in another.

Let's hear this contrast explained.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy - John Searle & Bryan Magee (1987)

Here, John Searle explains Wittgenstein's move away from the picture metaphor to the tool/use metaphor and highlights the profound implications of this shift.

Watch from 08:59 to 11:32. Pay close attention to the fundamental reversal: instead of reality determining the structure of language, language is now seen as determining how we conceptualize reality.

Let's return to the Hurtado article to see a more detailed analysis of this later philosophy.

Wittgenstein on Meaning: From the Tractatus to the ...

This reading explores why Wittgenstein abandoned the picture theory and elaborates on his new understanding of meaning based on use, rules, and context.

Read the sections 'The Picture Theory of Meaning Broke Down,' 'The Trouble with the Tractatus,' 'The Nature of Logic in the Philosophical Investigations,' and the untitled section that follows it. Focus on the reasons for rejecting the picture theory and the key concepts of the later work, such as the rejection of precise definitions and the idea that grammar is independent of the world.

3. The Contrast Summarized

The shift from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations represents one of the most significant transformations in modern thought. Let's lay out the core contrasts in a table.

Feature	Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus)	Later Wittgenstein (Investigations)
Metaphor for Language	A Picture or Mirror of Reality	A Toolbox for Human Activities
Essence of Meaning	Representation. A word's meaning is the object it stands for. A sentence's meaning is the state of affairs it depicts.	Use. A word's meaning is its function in a language-game.
Ideal Language	A single, logically perfect language is the ideal. Ordinary language is often confusing and conceals logical form.	Ordinary language is perfectly in order as it is. There is no ideal language, only a multiplicity of uses.
Primary Unit	The elementary proposition, which pictures an atomic fact.	The language-game, a whole activity involving language.
Essence vs. Diversity	Assumes language has a single essence: to picture the world.	Rejects the idea of an essence. Language is a diverse collection of activities.
Role of Philosophy	Logical clarification. To show the logical structure of language and distinguish sense from nonsense.	Therapy. To dissolve philosophical problems by showing how they arise from misunderstandings of the logic of our language.
Metaphysical Stance	Logico-Metaphysical Correspondence. The structure of language is metaphysically bound to the structure of reality.	Grammar is Autonomous. Rules of language are conventions, not reflections of a metaphysical reality.

Test your understanding!

Consider the question: "What is Justice?"

How would the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations respond to this question?

Show answer

Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus):

The early Wittgenstein would dismiss the question itself as a form of nonsense. According to the picture theory, a meaningful word must name a simple object. "Justice" does not name any such object in the world. You cannot point to a simple, atomic "thing" that is Justice. Therefore, sentences like "This act is just" do not picture a state of affairs. They are not false; they are meaningless. Questions about ethics and values lie outside the limits of what can be said. As he concludes the Tractatus: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations):

The later Wittgenstein would not try to give a single definition of "Justice." Instead, he would say that to understand the meaning of the word "justice," we must look at how it is used in various language-games.

He would investigate questions like:

In a court of law, what is the language-game of determining a "just" verdict? What rules are followed?
When parents try to be "just" in dividing a treat between their children, what does that activity look like?
When we discuss "social justice," what kind of conversation is that? What are its aims and context?
When we call a person "just," how does that differ from calling an action or a system "just"?

He would argue that there is no single "thing" called Justice that all these uses have in common. Instead, they are related to one another in complex ways, like the different faces in a family album (an idea we will explore in the next lesson called "family resemblance"). The philosophical mistake is to assume that because we have one word, there must be one underlying essence. The "meaning" of justice is the sum total of these uses.

Conclusion

In this lesson, we have charted the remarkable intellectual journey of Ludwig Wittgenstein, contrasting the two major pillars of his philosophical legacy.

Key Takeaways:

Wittgenstein's early philosophy in the Tractatus is centered on the picture theory of meaning, which posits a strict, isomorphic relationship between a logically perfect language and the facts of the world.
His later philosophy in the Philosophical Investigations completely rejects this view, arguing instead that meaning is use.
This shift involved moving from the metaphor of language as a picture to language as a toolbox.
The focus shifted from seeking a single, hidden logical essence of language to describing the diverse multiplicity of language-games that constitute our ordinary linguistic life.

This turn from formal logic to ordinary language had a profound effect on the direction of analytic philosophy, creating a new branch of inquiry that ran parallel to, and often in opposition to, the more scientifically-oriented philosophy of figures like Quine.

Preview of the Next Lesson:

We have been introduced to the core concepts of "meaning as use" and "language-games." In our next lesson, we will delve deeper into these ideas. We will explore what exactly constitutes a language-game and examine another key concept of the later Wittgenstein: "family resemblance." This will help us understand how he accounts for general terms without resorting to the classical idea of fixed definitions or essences.