Turkle's Evocative Objects and Relational Artifacts

Hello! Welcome to the fifth lesson in our module on the foundational concepts of human-AI relationships.

In our last lesson, we delved into the Computers Are Social Actors (CASA) paradigm. We saw how it provided experimental proof that humans automatically and unconsciously apply social rules to computers, treating them like social beings without even realizing it. This "mindless" sociality is a crucial piece of the puzzle.

Today, we shift our focus from these automatic reactions to the deeper, more emotional and reflective side of our engagement with technology. We will explore the foundational work of MIT sociologist and psychologist Sherry Turkle, a pioneering and often critical voice in this field for over four decades. Her work examines how technology doesn't just do things for us, but also does things to us, changing how we think about ourselves and our relationships.

By the end of this lesson, you will be able to:

Explain Sherry Turkle's concepts of 'evocative objects' and 'relational artifacts' from her early work ('The Second Self').

These two concepts provide a powerful framework for understanding the evolution of our connection to computational objects, from tools that make us think, to companions that make us feel.

1. Evocative Objects: Computers as Philosophical Tools

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when personal computers were just beginning to enter homes and schools, they were very different from the devices we use today. They were not slick, sealed appliances. To use them, you often had to program them, giving users a window into their inner workings.

It was in this context that Turkle developed her first key concept: the evocative object. She observed that these early computers were not just tools for calculation; they were objects that provoked profound reflection, especially for children. They were "objects-to-think-with."

To hear Turkle describe this in her own words, please watch the following clip from an interview.

As Turkle explains, these early computers were "evocative" because they were both machinelike and mindlike, blurring a line that people previously took for granted. This ambiguity prompted fundamental questions:

• What does it mean to "think"?
• Is my mind programmed like a computer?
• What makes people different from machines? Is it that we have feelings?

An evocative object, then, is an object that raises new questions and causes us to reconsider our understanding of ourselves and our world. For Turkle, the early personal computer was a powerful evocative object because its transparent, programmable nature made us confront the boundary between human and machine, mind and program.

2. Relational Artifacts: The Rise of the Sociable Machine

By the mid-1990s, the technological landscape had changed. Computers were no longer transparent, programmable boxes. They were becoming opaque appliances, and a new category of computational object was emerging: the sociable, or "relational," machine.

This led to Turkle's second key concept. A relational artifact is a computational object explicitly designed to have a mutual, emotional relationship with a person.

These artifacts, like Tamagotchis, Furbies, and social robots, weren't designed to be tools or to showcase their intelligence. They were designed to be companions, to elicit care, and to "push our Darwinian buttons," as Turkle says, triggering our innate tendencies to nurture and form attachments.

To understand this shift, let's turn to a paper by Turkle that defines and explores these objects.

As the reading highlights, the power of relational artifacts comes not from what they are (complex programs), but from what they evoke in us.

• They ask for nurturance. A Tamagotchi "dies" if you don't care for it. A Furby asks for attention. This dynamic positions the human as a caregiver.
• This leads to attachment. As Turkle notes, we don't just nurture what we love; we come to love what we nurture. Caring for the artifact creates a real emotional bond.
• They focus on our vulnerabilities. These objects succeed by tapping into our fundamental human needs for connection, companionship, and to feel needed.

This marks a significant change from the early evocative objects. The question is no longer just "What is this machine?" but "What is this machine to me?" and "What am I to it?"

3. Projection vs. Engagement: The Key Distinction

So, what is the fundamental difference between an evocative object like an early PC and a relational artifact like a Furby? Turkle frames it as a shift from a psychology of projection to a psychology of engagement.

• Psychology of Projection: This is what we do with traditional toys like dolls or teddy bears. They are passive and inert. A child projects their own thoughts, feelings, and narratives onto the doll. The doll becomes a screen for the child's inner world. The early "evocative objects" worked in a similar way, acting as screens for our philosophical reflections.

• Psychology of Engagement: Relational artifacts are different. They are active and interactive. A robot doesn't just sit there waiting for you to imagine its thoughts; it looks at you, speaks to you, and makes demands. It initiates. This moves the interaction from one of projection to one of engagement, where you are in a simulated two-way relationship.

The following reading from an interview with Turkle makes this distinction crystal clear.

This distinction is crucial. With projection, the object is a tool for self-discovery. With engagement, the artifact presents itself as a subject, a friend, a companion. This changes the nature of the relationship and, Turkle argues, has profound consequences for how we understand concepts like empathy, companionship, and authenticity.

A relational artifact is, in fact, a specific type of evocative object. While an early PC was evocative of questions about the mind, a relational artifact is evocative of questions about relationships, attachment, and love.

Conclusion

Today we explored two of Sherry Turkle's foundational concepts for understanding our relationship with technology. These ideas move us beyond the automatic social responses of the CASA paradigm and into the complex emotional and psychological territory of attachment.

Key Takeaways:

• Evocative Object: A technology that prompts deep, often philosophical, reflection about ourselves and our world. Early PCs, with their transparent and programmable nature, served as evocative objects that made people question the nature of thought and identity.
• Relational Artifact: A computational object specifically designed to engage a user in an emotional relationship, often by eliciting care and nurturance. Examples include Tamagotchis, Furbies, and social robots.
• Projection vs. Engagement: Traditional objects (and early evocative objects) support a psychology of projection, where we use them as screens for our own thoughts. Relational artifacts foster a psychology of engagement, where we enter into a simulated two-way relationship with an active agent.

Preview of the Next Lesson:

We've seen that we form these complex attachments to objects, and Turkle has given us a vocabulary to describe them. But why does this happen so easily? What are the underlying psychological mechanisms that make us see a machine as a thinking, feeling being?

In our next and final lesson of this module, we will explore Nicholas Epley's three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. This theory provides a powerful model for explaining why and when we attribute humanlike characteristics to non-human agents, giving us the "why" behind the phenomena described by Turkle.