In our last lesson, we examined the ethics of belief, contrasting W.K. Clifford's strict evidentialism with William James's pragmatist "will to believe." That debate revolved around when we are permitted to believe, assuming that the project of gathering and evaluating evidence is, at least in principle, possible. Today, we drill down to a more fundamental and perplexing challenge that questions the very starting point of any epistemological inquiry.
This lesson addresses the Problem of the Criterion, a classic puzzle that exposes a potential circularity at the heart of our quest for knowledge. We will explore its structure, the main attempts to solve it, and its profound implications for philosophy. This will capstone our module on the nature of knowledge before we transition to the study of metaphysics.
1. The Wheel of Justification
The Problem of the Criterion is sometimes called the "diallelus," Greek for "through or by means of one another," or more simply, "the wheel." It arises from two seemingly simple and interdependent questions about knowledge.
To have a firm grasp of any subject, you must be able to distinguish what is true from what is false. To do this, you need a reliable method, or a criterion. But how do you know your criterion is reliable? You would have to test it to see if it successfully identifies true things and rejects false ones. But to do that, you must already know which things are true and false to check the criterion against.
The 20th-century philosopher Roderick Chisholm, who revitalized this ancient problem for contemporary philosophy, put the dilemma in terms of sorting apples.
Roderick Chisholm, "The Problem of the Criterion"
In his foundational paper, Chisholm uses a simple analogy to lay out the problem's structure.
First, read his analogy of sorting apples. Then, study his formal presentation of the two central questions, which he labels 'A' and 'B', in the section that follows, up to where he explains the skeptic's position (the two questions).
As Chisholm frames it, we are caught between two questions:
- (A) What do we know? (The instances or extent of our knowledge)
- (B) How are we to decide whether we know? (The criteria for knowledge)
The skeptic argues that you cannot answer (A) without an answer to (B), and you cannot answer (B) without an answer to (A). Therefore, you cannot answer either. It seems that any attempt to start our epistemological project is doomed to be either circular or based on an arbitrary assumption. From your background in physics and computer science, you can see this as a bootstrapping problem: a system cannot validate its own validation protocol without an external, trusted standard. The Problem of the Criterion asks where such a standard for knowledge itself could possibly come from.
2. Chisholm's Three Responses
If we are to avoid this skeptical conclusion, we must find a way to break the circle. Chisholm identifies three possible stances one can take: skepticism, "methodism," and "particularism."
The following video provides an excellent and concise explanation of these three positions and the fundamental issue Chisholm finds with each of them.
This video, "The Problem of the Criterion" by Kane B, clearly lays out the core dilemma and Chisholm's three proposed responses.
First, watch the introduction to get a feel for the problem's structure (the core problem). Then, pay close attention to the explanation of the three responses: particularism, methodism, and skepticism. Focus on how each position attempts to provide a starting point and why Chisholm argues that each one "begs the question" against the others.
Let's summarize the three positions:
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Methodism: The methodist claims to have an answer to question (B) first. They start with a criterion for knowledge and use it to figure out what we know. A classic example is the empiricism of John Locke or David Hume, which begins with a criterion like: "A belief is justified only if it is derived from sense experience." They then apply this rule to determine which specific beliefs (the answer to A) are legitimate. The problem? The initial criterion seems arbitrary. Why that one and not another?
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Particularism: The particularist claims to have an answer to question (A) first. They start with a set of things they are confident they know (e.g., "I know I have hands," "I know I am conscious") and then generalize from these particular instances to formulate a criterion (the answer to B) that explains why these are cases of knowledge. This is the position Chisholm himself favored, along with philosophers like G.E. Moore. The problem? This approach seems to assume what it's trying to prove. The skeptic will ask, "But how do you know those initial beliefs are genuine knowledge?"
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Skepticism: The skeptic insists that the deadlock is unbreakable. Since both methodism and particularism start with an ungrounded assumption, neither provides a satisfactory escape from the circle. Therefore, we can answer neither question and cannot begin the project of epistemology.
Chisholm's unsettling conclusion is that we have no choice but to "beg the question." He argues that since all three positions rest on an initial, unprovable assumption, we should choose the one that is most reasonable and allows us to make progress. For him, that was particularism, because he felt it was just common sense that we do know many things.
3. The Problem That Never Ends
One might think that once we bite the bullet and choose a starting point (say, particularism), the problem is solved. However, one of the most troubling aspects of the Problem of the Criterion is that it can reappear at every subsequent stage of inquiry.
Let's return to the same video to see how the problem is recursive. This section demonstrates that even if you "solve" the problem once, it keeps coming back.
Watch the segment on the recurring nature of the problem, starting around the scope of the problem. The example of empiricism is particularly illustrative.
As the video explains, even if we adopt the empiricist's criterion ("all knowledge derives from sense experience"), we immediately face a new Problem of the Criterion:
- (A') Which experiences count as "sense experience"?
- (B') What is the criterion for distinguishing "sense experience" from other mental states like dreams, intuitions, or memories?
And if we solve that, we face another:
- (A'') Which propositions are actually justified by a given sense experience?
- (B'') What is the criterion for a proposition being justified by an experience (e.g., must it be infallible, probable, the best explanation)?
This recursive structure is reminiscent of the hierarchy of standards in metrology. To calibrate an instrument, you need a standard. That standard must be calibrated against a higher-level standard, and so on. The process must terminate somewhere, in a primary standard that is established by definition or convention. The Problem of the Criterion suggests that our entire system of knowledge might rest on a similar, epistemically arbitrary foundation.
4. Can We Answer Both Questions at Once?
Given the unappealing nature of Chisholm's three options, some philosophers have proposed a fourth way: Coherentism. The coherentist suggests that we don't need to answer (A) before (B) or (B) before (A). Instead, we can work on both simultaneously, adjusting our beliefs about particular facts and our beliefs about epistemic criteria until they form a maximally coherent, mutually supporting system. This method is often called "reflective equilibrium."
The coherentist response is an intuitive and popular attempt to get off the "wheel." Let's look at how it works and the primary objection to it.
Watch the section of the video explaining the coherentist solution. Pay attention to the desert mirage example, which shows the process of adjusting beliefs and criteria in practice. Crucially, understand the objection that coherentism might just be a subtle form of methodism.
The coherentist approach is powerful. It mirrors how we often reason in both science and everyday life—we start with a set of data and a preliminary theory, and we adjust both in light of new information until they fit together.
However, as the video points out, coherentism faces a powerful objection. In aiming for a "coherent system," isn't the coherentist simply adopting a higher-level criterion—namely, coherence—from the outset? If so, coherentism is just a sophisticated form of methodism, and it still begins with an arbitrary assumption. Why should we seek coherence rather than, say, simplicity, aesthetic beauty, or even maximal incoherence? The problem, it seems, re-emerges at a higher level.
For a deeper dive into these alternative responses, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the "Problem of the Criterion" is an excellent resource for further study.
Conclusion
The Problem of the Criterion represents one of the most fundamental challenges in epistemology. It questions our very ability to establish a firm foundation for knowledge without falling into circularity or making arbitrary assumptions.
- Key Takeaways:
- The problem arises from the circular relationship between knowing what is true (instances of knowledge) and knowing how to tell what is true (criteria for knowledge).
- Roderick Chisholm outlined three main responses:
- Methodism: Start with a criterion, then identify knowledge.
- Particularism: Start with instances of knowledge, then derive a criterion.
- Skepticism: Argue that the circle is unbreakable and knowledge is ungrounded.
- Chisholm's view is that any choice is a form of begging the question, but that particularism is the most "reasonable" choice.
- The problem is recursive: it can re-emerge at every level of inquiry, creating an endless regress of justification.
- Coherentism attempts to solve the problem by answering both questions simultaneously, seeking a "reflective equilibrium" between our beliefs and our criteria, though it too may rely on an ungrounded master criterion (coherence).
This problem leaves us in a precarious position, forcing us to confront the ultimate grounds for our beliefs. It is a powerful tool for developing epistemic humility.
Preview of the Next Lesson:
We have now reached the end of our module on epistemology. We have explored the structure of knowledge, the ethics of belief, and the fundamental challenge of the criterion. In the next module, we will pivot from the theory of knowledge to Metaphysics, the branch of philosophy concerned with the fundamental nature of reality. We will begin by asking: What are the ultimate constituents of the world? Are they stable, enduring objects ("substances"), or is reality fundamentally a flow of events ("processes")? Our first lesson will delve into the classic debate between substance ontology and process ontology.