Introduction
Welcome to our final lesson on Heidegger's early philosophy. In previous lessons, we've explored Husserl's project of founding philosophy as a rigorous science of consciousness and Heidegger's radical alternative, which begins with the concrete, situated existence of Dasein. You've learned about Heidegger's core concepts: Being-in-the-world, the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, thrownness, and the disclosive power of mood (Befindlichkeit).
Today, we will synthesize this knowledge to achieve a crucial learning outcome: to articulate Heidegger's key departures from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. This is not just an academic exercise in comparing two thinkers. Understanding precisely how and why Heidegger broke from his teacher is essential for grasping the trajectory of 20th-century phenomenology. It was this very break that created the philosophical space for Merleau-Ponty to develop his own unique philosophy of the lived body, which will be the focus of the rest of our course.
We will proceed systematically by examining four fundamental areas where Heidegger transforms Husserl's project.
1. The Starting Point: From Transcendental Consciousness to Dasein
The most fundamental disagreement between Husserl and Heidegger concerns the proper starting point for philosophy.
- Husserl, in the Cartesian tradition, begins with consciousness. Through the phenomenological reduction (
epoché), he brackets the "natural attitude" to isolate a purified, detached, transcendental ego. For Husserl, this transcendental subject is the absolute foundation that "constitutes" (gives meaning to) the world. - Heidegger rejects this entire framework. He argues that this picture of a detached subject observing a world of objects is an artificial abstraction. Philosophy's starting point cannot be consciousness, but must be the unitary phenomenon of
Daseinas Being-in-the-world. We don't start as isolated minds that have to "prove" or "get to" an external world; we are always already in it, engaged, and involved.
This first video, a classic dialogue between Bryan Magee and Hubert Dreyfus, powerfully illustrates this initial, decisive break.
Husserl, Heidegger & Existentialism - Hubert Dreyfus & Bryan Magee (1987)
In this segment, Professor Dreyfus explains how Heidegger, by taking Husserl's call to 'go to the things themselves' seriously, discovered that our primary way of being is not as a subject contemplating objects.
Please watch the video in two parts: From 08:35 to 09:19: Focus on how Heidegger reacted against the traditional subject-object picture that Husserl's work clarified. From 15:49 to 18:06: Pay attention to Heidegger's critique of the 'scandal' of philosophy trying to prove an external world, and his introduction of the term 'Dasein' to replace concepts like subject, person, or mind.
Heidegger's shift is profound. The problem is no longer "How can a subject know an object?" but "What does it mean to be this entity (Dasein) whose being consists in being-in-a-world?"
2. The Philosophical Method: From Pure Description to Hermeneutics
This new starting point demands a new method. While both philosophers use the term "phenomenology," they mean very different things by it.
- Husserl's phenomenology is a descriptive science of pure consciousness. The
epochéis a tool to achieve a detached, "presuppositionless" standpoint from which to describe the essential structures (or eide) of experience. - Heidegger reinterprets phenomenology as hermeneutics—the art of interpretation. For him, a "presuppositionless" standpoint is impossible. Dasein is always already in a world, with a history, a language, and a pre-existing understanding of Being. Therefore, philosophy is not a pure description from nowhere, but an interpretation of the meaning of Being that is carried out from within our historical situation.
The following reading from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy clearly outlines how Heidegger adopts Husserl's vocabulary but gives it a completely different meaning.
Heidegger, Martin | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This article provides a concise and systematic comparison of Husserl and Heidegger's methods, which will help solidify your understanding.
Please read the section titled '2. Philosophy as Phenomenological Ontology'. Focus on the contrast between Husserl's goal (descriptive analysis of consciousness) and Heidegger's (a method to access being), and especially how Heidegger reinterprets the 'phenomenological reduction'.
As the article notes, Heidegger’s reduction isn't about bracketing the world to get to consciousness. It's about looking at an entity we encounter in the world (like a hammer) and shifting our focus from the entity itself to its mode of Being (e.g., its ready-to-hand-ness).
3. The Core Structure: From Intentionality to Care
Flowing from the different starting points and methods is a different view of the fundamental structure of our existence.
- For Husserl, the central structure is intentionality: the directedness of consciousness toward an object. This is primarily a cognitive relationship where consciousness bestows meaning on its objects.
- For Heidegger, this is a derivative mode. The more fundamental structure is Being-in-the-world, which he formally names Care (
Sorge). Care is the unified structure of Dasein's existence, encompassing its practical involvements (ready-to-hand), its attunement (Befindlichkeit), and its orientation toward its own possibilities. We are primarily "caring" beings, not "knowing" beings. Cognitive intentionality only emerges when our smooth, caring absorption in the world is disrupted (e.g., when the hammer breaks).
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article you have in your resources offers a precise summary of these transformations. It points out that in Heidegger's development, "Husserlian intentionality ... will have been replaced by the concept of care or Being-in-the-world".
4. The Goal of Philosophy: From Rigorous Science to Fundamental Ontology
Finally, the two thinkers had radically different ambitions for the entire philosophical project.
- Husserl's goal was to establish philosophy as a foundational, rigorous science. He believed a pure phenomenology of consciousness could provide the ultimate, certain grounding for all other fields of knowledge.
- Heidegger is not interested in providing a foundation for the sciences. His goal is fundamental ontology: to reawaken and answer the Question of the Meaning of Being (
Seinsfrage). The analysis of Dasein's existence (Daseinsanalytik) is merely the necessary first step, because Dasein is the unique entity for whom Being is an issue.
This next clip explains this shift in philosophical ambition.
A History of Philosophy | 70 Husserl and Heidegger
This lecture by Arthur Holmes at Wheaton College contrasts Husserl's project of 'transcendental phenomenology' with Heidegger's 'existential phenomenology,' highlighting Heidegger's move away from foundationalism.
Watch from 33:04 to 39:22. Focus on the distinction made between Husserl's concern with establishing a 'new kind of foundationalism' and Heidegger's focus on the 'Universal structures of existence' as a way to access the 'ground of being'.
Synthesis: A Systematic Comparison
To bring these points together in a structured way that aligns with your preference for systematic reasoning, here is a summary table:
| Feature | Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology | Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology |
|---|---|---|
| Starting Point | The transcendental ego (pure consciousness), isolated from the world. | Dasein, an entity whose very being is Being-in-the-world. |
| Fundamental Structure | Intentionality: The cognitive directedness of consciousness to objects. | Care (Sorge): The pre-cognitive, practical, and affective engagement in a world. |
| Method | Phenomenological Reduction (epoché): Bracketing the world to get to pure essence. |
Hermeneutics: Interpreting the meaning of Being from within our historical existence. |
| Goal of Philosophy | Rigorous Science: To provide a certain foundation for all knowledge. | Fundamental Ontology: To pose and answer the Question of the Meaning of Being (Seinsfrage). |
This diagram offers another way to visualize the shift. Husserl's "sub-ject" is conceived as a self-contained consciousness that relates to objects. Heidegger rethinks the human as "e-ject" or "ex-sistence"—a being that is fundamentally "standing outside" of itself and into the world.
Conclusion
Today, we have systematically charted Heidegger's radical departure from his teacher, Husserl. This was not a minor disagreement but a complete re-founding of the phenomenological project.
Key Takeaways:
- Heidegger shifts the starting point of philosophy from transcendental consciousness to the engaged, worldly existence of
Dasein. - He transforms the method from a pure description of consciousness to a hermeneutic interpretation of Being.
- He replaces intentionality as the primary structure of experience with the more fundamental, practical-affective structure of Care (
Sorge). - He changes the goal of philosophy from establishing a foundational science to pursuing fundamental ontology—the question of the meaning of Being itself.
Preview of the Next Lesson:
Having established the distinct positions of Husserl and Heidegger, we are now perfectly positioned to introduce Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty was deeply influenced by both thinkers. He embraced the critique of intellectualism and the turn to lived, worldly existence, but he felt that even Heidegger remained too abstract. For Merleau-Ponty, the key that both had overlooked was the centrality of the lived body. In our next lesson, we will begin Module 4 by situating Merleau-Ponty within the phenomenological tradition relative to Husserl and Heidegger, setting the stage for his unique contribution.