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Lesson 45

Merleau-Ponty's Embodied Communication: The Role of Gesture

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Introduction

Welcome to our second lesson on expression and intersubjectivity. In our last session, we established the concept of intercorporeality: the direct, pre-reflective recognition of another subject through their bodily presence. We saw that this is possible because our own lived body is a "system of equivalences," capable of understanding the meaning of another's actions because they resonate with our own motor possibilities.

Today, we build directly on that foundation to address a core component of human interaction: communication. How does the embodied understanding we explored give rise to shared meaning? The traditional answer is that we formulate thoughts privately in our minds and then use words or gestures as external tools to transmit them. Merleau-Ponty finds this model deeply flawed.

The learning outcome for this lesson is to explain the role of gesture in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of communication. We will see that for Merleau-Ponty, a gesture—whether of the hand or of the voice—does not simply point to a pre-existing thought. Instead, it is the very embodiment and enactment of meaning in the world.


1. Rejecting the Intellectualist Model

To understand Merleau-Ponty's position, we must first clearly define the view he opposes. This is the intellectualist or rationalist model of communication. In this view, meaning is something purely mental—a concept or proposition—that exists fully formed in a private, internal space. Language and gesture are then secondary instruments, like containers or labels, used to package this mental content for transport to another mind.

The following reading from an essay by Mark Johnson on Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language clearly outlines this traditional view and contrasts it with the embodied alternative that Merleau-Ponty proposes.

[PDF] Merleau-Ponty's Embodied Semantics —From Immanent Meaning ...

This text, 'Merleau-Ponty’s Embodied Semantics' by Mark Johnson, will help us systematize the traditional view that Merleau-Ponty critiques before presenting his alternative. This structured approach, defining the problem before solving it, aligns with the clear, step-by-step reasoning you prefer.

Please read the portion of Section I that contrasts two theories of meaning. Start at the paragraph beginning, 'The principle shortcoming of analytic philosophy...'. Read through the bulleted list for 'The Conceptual/Propositional Theory of Meaning' and the subsequent bulleted list for 'The Embodied Theory of Meaning,' ending before the paragraph that discusses Dewey's 'principle of continuity.' Focus on the core claims of each model. What is the basic unit of meaning for the intellectualist view? Where does meaning emerge from, according to the embodied view?

As the text lays out, the intellectualist model treats meaning as propositional and disembodied. It presumes a sharp distinction between a private "inside" (thought) and a public "outside" (expression). Merleau-Ponty argues that this model is an abstraction that fails to describe how communication actually happens.

If this model were true, communication would be a constant process of encoding and decoding. I would have a thought, translate it into words, and you would hear those words and translate them back into the original thought. Success would be a matter of perfect translation. But this leaves a mystery: how do we ever learn a language in the first place? And how can a new idea—one for which no conventional "label" yet exists—ever be expressed?


2. Gesture as the Enactment of Meaning

Merleau-Ponty's solution is to collapse the distinction between thought and expression. Meaning is not something that happens before the gesture; it comes into being in the gesture. The gesture—and as we will see, the word—is the thought taking its form in the shared world.

Consider the act of pointing to something to draw a friend's attention to it. The intellectualist view would say you first have the internal thought, "I want my friend to look at that object," and then you perform the physical action of pointing as an external sign for that thought.

Merleau-Ponty would say the gesture of pointing is the realization of that intention. It's an act that re-structures the perceptual field, for you and your friend, making the object emerge as a figure against a ground. The meaning is the act itself. The following reading develops this central idea.

[PDF] Merleau-Ponty's Embodied Semantics —From Immanent Meaning ...

We'll continue with Johnson's paper, which now moves to explain Merleau-Ponty's positive account of gestural meaning.

Please read all of Section II, 'The Embodied Meaning of Gesture.' It's a short but crucial section. Pay close attention to the central claim: 'Gestures are bodily enactments of meaning. They are not uses of bodily motions to express some pre-conceived thoughts. Rather, the gesture itself brings the meaning into existence.'

This section is the core of today's lesson. It makes several key points:

  • Meaning inhabits the word/gesture: It is not externally associated with it.
  • Expression is a "taking up of a position": When I gesture or speak, I am adopting a certain orientation within a shared world of meanings. This builds on our earlier discussions of Being-in-the-world.
  • Gesture is the incarnation of meaning: The thought is not behind the gesture; it is realized through it. The meaning of an angry gesture is not a private feeling of anger, but the bodily act of creating an atmosphere of anger that is immediately perceptible to others.

The examples from psychologist David McNeill (iconic, metaphoric, and beat gestures) provide concrete illustrations. When you describe a spiral staircase by making a circling motion with your hand (an iconic gesture), the gesture doesn't just represent the shape; it performs it. It brings that form into existence in the space between you and your listener.


3. The Spoken Word is a Gesture

The most radical and important step in Merleau-Ponty's argument is to extend this analysis of physical gesture to language itself. For him, the spoken word is a vocal gesture. It functions in precisely the same way as a bodily one.

Just as a physical gesture uses the body to structure space, a vocal gesture uses the voice and the whole apparatus of phonation to structure a "world of meanings."

[PDF] Merleau-Ponty's Embodied Semantics —From Immanent Meaning ...

The final reading for today explicitly makes the connection between physical gesture and language, which is the capstone of Merleau-Ponty's theory of communication.

In the PDF, this section is titled 'IV. From Gesture to Art to Language.' Please read the first two paragraphs of this section. It starts with, 'Merleau-Ponty wanted to connect gesture, art, and linguistic meaning...' and ends with the sentence, 'This is what makes communication possible.'

This leads to the crucial conclusion articulated in the text: "The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture contains its. This is what makes communication possible."

Communication is possible not because we are expert decoders of each other's private mental symbols, but because we are beings whose bodies are open to the world and to each other. My spoken words, like my gestures, are modulations of a shared existence. They don't just transmit information; they solicit a response from you, inviting you into a particular way of seeing and being. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article "Maurice Merleau-Ponty" puts it, language expresses meaning "through its style or physiognomy as a bodily gesture" (Resource LINK).

This connects directly back to our previous lesson on intercorporeality. I understand your vocal gesture for the same reason I understand your physical one: my body, with its own capacity for speech, recognizes the intention within your words. The meaning of your words is not a hidden thought, but a pattern of behaviour that my own body can grasp and, in a sense, simulate. As Johnson's article concludes, quoting Merleau-Ponty, the "phonetic ‘gesture’ brings about...a certain structural co-ordination of experience."


Conclusion

In this lesson, we have moved from the silent communion of bodies to the expressive power of communication. By treating gesture as the primary model for all expression, Merleau-Ponty offers a powerful alternative to intellectualist theories of language.

Key Takeaways:

  • Merleau-Ponty rejects the intellectualist view that gesture and language are neutral tools used to translate pre-existing, private thoughts.
  • A gesture is the enactment of meaning; the thought comes into being through its expression in the world. It is a "taking up of a position" in a shared environment.
  • The spoken word is a vocal gesture. It carries its meaning not as a label refers to an object, but as a physical gesture embodies an intention.
  • Communication is therefore possible not through a mysterious decoding of private minds, but through our intercorporeal ability to grasp the meaning enacted in another's gestures, both physical and vocal. These gestures create a shared world of meaning.

Preview of the Next Lesson:

This account of expression raises an important question. If language is a creative gesture, what about all the times we use words conventionally, without any creative effort? Merleau-Ponty was well aware of this. In our next lesson, we will explore his crucial distinction between 'speaking speech' (parole parlante)—the authentic, creative gesture that brings new meaning into the world—and 'spoken speech' (parole parlée)—the sedimented, habitual language we use every day.