Religious Experience as Epistemic Source

Introduction

In our last lesson, we looked at G.E. Moore's robust defense of common sense. He argued that certain beliefs, like "I have hands," are so foundational that they are more certain than any philosophical argument designed to undermine them. This introduced us to the powerful idea that some beliefs might be reasonably held without being proven by other beliefs.

Today, we'll see how this concept is applied in a domain you're especially interested in: religious belief. Our goal is to explain how a personal religious experience—a feeling, a vision, or a sense of divine presence—is framed not merely as an emotional event, but as a legitimate source of knowledge or justified belief.

We will explore this by looking at a few key philosophical ideas: the general principle of trusting our experiences, the specific nature of religious experiences, and finally, how Christian and LDS thinkers frame these experiences as being grounded in the witness of the Holy Spirit.

Part 1: Should We Trust Our Experiences? The Principle of Credulity

Let's begin with a simple question: If you have an experience that seems to be of God, is it rational to believe it?

Philosopher Richard Swinburne argues that the answer is yes. He proposes what is known as the Principle of Credulity, which states that we should generally trust our experiences unless we have a specific reason to doubt them.

To explore this idea, let's look at a brief summary from an article published by BYU's College of Humanities.

Swinburne's point is intuitive. You trust your sense experience all the time. If you see a cup on your desk, you believe it's there. You don't first try to prove your senses are reliable; you assume they are until proven otherwise (e.g., you realize you're dreaming or hallucinating). Swinburne, and others like philosopher William Alston, argue that it's arbitrary to apply a different standard to religious experiences simply because they are unusual. If it seems to you that God is present, the Principle of Credulity says you are justified in believing it, pending any strong counter-evidence.

Part 2: The Nature of Religious Experience: William James

Accepting that we should trust our experiences, what is the nature of a "religious experience" itself? The classic analysis comes from the American psychologist and philosopher William James. In his seminal work, The Varieties of Religious Experience, James took a pragmatic approach. He wasn't trying to prove that God caused these experiences, but rather to document them and their profound, often life-changing, effects on individuals.

For James, these experiences are self-authenticating for the person having them. That is, the experience itself provides the authentication; it feels real and true to the individual, and that is what matters.

The following video provides an excellent summary of James's findings, including his four famous characteristics of mystical experiences.

As the video explains, James identified four common markers of these mystical states:

1. Ineffability: The experience is beyond words. The person feels they cannot adequately describe what happened.
2. Noetic Quality: This is crucial. The experience is not just a feeling; it is a state of knowledge. The person comes away convinced they have learned something or gained insight into a deep truth.
3. Transiency: The experience itself is usually brief, but its effects can be long-lasting and life-altering.
4. Passivity: The person feels as if they are being acted upon by a superior power, rather than being in control of the experience.

The noetic quality is the key that unlocks how religious experience is framed as a source of knowledge. It's not just "I felt good"; it's "I came to know that God exists" or "I understood that I am forgiven."

Part 3: From Subjective Feeling to Justified Belief

We've established that religious experiences feel like they impart knowledge (a noetic quality) and that we have a general principle to trust our experiences (credulity). But how, precisely, does a personal, subjective experience provide epistemic justification for a belief?

This is where your interest in an LDS perspective and the bridge from our last lesson on Moore converge. Theologians and philosophers, particularly within the Christian tradition, have developed sophisticated models for this.

A key concept is what philosophers call "seemings" or phenomenal conservatism. The idea is simple: if something seems to you to be true, you have some initial, or prima facie, justification for believing it.

In a religious context, this "seeming" is often understood as the witness of the Holy Spirit. It's not just a random feeling but a divinely-caused intuition that a specific proposition is true. The following article from FAIR Latter-day Saints connects this idea directly to LDS theology.

As the article explains, the Holy Ghost can be seen as the source of these powerful "seemings" or spiritual intuitions. When a person prays and feels a confirmation, this model frames that feeling as a form of evidence—a divinely grounded "seeming" that provides justification for belief.

This idea has been rigorously developed in contemporary philosophy of religion by Alvin Plantinga, whose work on "Reformed Epistemology" is central to this topic. Plantinga argues that belief in God can be "properly basic"—that is, it can be a rational starting point, much like Moore's belief that he has hands. For Plantinga, a belief is properly basic if it is formed by our cognitive faculties working properly. He proposes that humans have a natural faculty (which he calls the sensus divinitatis, or sense of the divine) that, when prompted by experiences like viewing a sunset or feeling gratitude, produces the belief in God.

In the Christian model, this process is perfected by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit's witness isn't just an argument for God; it's a direct experience that grounds the belief itself.

To see this philosophical account in more detail, the video below explains how the Holy Spirit's work is understood to produce these justified beliefs.

The concept of an "intrinsic defeater-defeater" is a powerful conclusion. It frames the knowledge gained from a spiritual witness as so firm that it can rationally withstand opposing arguments, not because the believer can rebut every argument, but because the certainty of the initial experience is epistemically stronger.

Conclusion

Today we explored several ways in which personal religious experience is framed as a valid source of knowledge and justification. We moved from the general principle of trusting our experiences to the specific, knowledge-imparting nature of these events, and finally to a theological model where such experiences are understood as a direct witness from the Holy Spirit.

Key Takeaways:

• The Principle of Credulity suggests it's rational to trust a religious experience unless there is strong evidence to the contrary.
• William James characterized these experiences as often being ineffable, transient, passive, and possessing a noetic (knowledge-giving) quality.
• Philosophical-theological models frame the experience (e.g., the witness of the Holy Spirit) as producing "religious seemings." These divinely-caused intuitions provide epistemic justification for belief.
• This justification can be so strong that it functions as an "intrinsic defeater-defeater," allowing a belief to be rationally held even in the face of unrefuted objections.

Preview of the Next Lesson:
We've focused on direct, personal experience. But where does faith fit in? Is faith simply trusting these experiences, or is it something else? How does it relate to reason and evidence? In our next lesson, we will delve into the complex and crucial relationship between faith and reason, exploring the different roles they play in religious epistemology.