Welcome back. In the previous lesson, you separated a jurist’s religious evaluation of conduct from a state’s power to enforce a rule. This lesson examines what happens when a state goes a step further and puts selected juristic rules into an official code. The nineteenth-century Ottoman Mecelle provides a concrete case: it drew largely on Hanafi fiqh while changing how judges could use that fiqh in court.
From juristic learning to a court rule
Fiqh is not a single statute book. Within a legal school, jurists may preserve more than one view on a question, explain which view is generally preferred, and reason about how a rule applies to new circumstances. A judge working in that tradition is not free to choose any answer at will: the school’s authoritative opinions, court procedures, and the judge’s appointment all matter. Still, deciding a case may require substantial training in legal texts and judgment about which opinion fits.
For a brief visual comparison, watch this segment before turning to the historical code.
Justice and Islamic Law: Mazalim Courts and Legal Reform | Jonathan A.C. Brown
In “Justice and Islamic Law: Mazalim Courts and Legal Reform,” Jonathan A. C. Brown, speaking on Blogging Theology, contrasts the work of consulting Hanafi fiqh manuals with using a structured code.
Watch manuals and codes. Focus on his point that the Hanafi tradition contained multiple opinions even when one was dominant. The contrast concerns how judges find and apply rules, not a claim that earlier judges had unlimited freedom.
An official code changes the judge’s starting point. Instead of independently searching among relevant juristic works for the rule a court should apply, a judge in a matter covered by the code is directed to its enacted provisions. The underlying juristic tradition may remain important, but the state’s selection now has institutional authority in that court.
The Mecelle: selection from within fiqh

The Ottoman government commissioned the Mecelle rather than adopting a proposed French civil code. Drafted and promulgated in stages between 1869/70 and 1877, it contained 1,851 articles. Its subjects included contracts, civil liability, and some civil procedure—not every area of religious practice or state law.
Read historian Samy Ayoub’s account of why its drafters thought a code was needed.
Read Ayoub’s account to see both sides of the project: reliance on existing Hanafi jurisprudence and a state effort to make rules usable across its courts.
In the unheaded opening of the article, read from the sentence beginning “The decision to draft” through the description of the code’s subjects, ending “some principles of civil procedure”: the commission. Near the end of that opening discussion, find the paragraph on European involvement in commercial litigation; read from “European legal hegemony started” through “radical centralization and bureaucratization”: the pressures. Then, in “The Mecelle Report: Continuity of Late Hanafi Tradition,” begin at “Additionally, the report touches on a key problem” and continue through the explanation that officials could rely on the code “in their legal determinations”: the drafters’ case. Pay particular attention to the shortage of judges trained to navigate fiqh works, the existence of divergent Hanafi opinions, and the example about inspecting rooms before buying a house.
The drafters described fiqh as a vast field requiring skill to navigate. That posed a practical problem for new courts and officials who could not all be expected to resolve disagreements across Hanafi manuals. The code presented selected rules in a more accessible form, with the aim of making judgments on similar cases more consistent.
Selection did not mean simply copying an unchanging rulebook. Ayoub recounts the drafters’ example of a house purchase. Earlier jurists had treated seeing one room as sufficient when rooms were generally similar; later jurists required a buyer to see each room when their layouts had become more varied. In the drafters’ account, the concern—adequate knowledge of what was being purchased—remained, while the practical ruling changed with building customs. This is an example the drafters used to explain their reasoning; it should not be mistaken, on its own, for the wording of a particular Mecelle article.
That example also shows why “fiqh versus state law” is too simple a description. The state did not create these legal questions from nothing. Its committee worked within a Hanafi interpretive tradition, chose among its positions, and put rules into a form authorized for judicial use.
What changed for judicial discretion?
Ayoub emphasizes that the Mecelle was designed for judicial reasoning, not as a complete statement of a believer’s religious and ethical duties. Read his account of that distinction and of the code’s standardizing purpose.
Return to Ayoub’s article to distinguish a court’s use of codified fiqh from fiqh’s wider role in religious life.
In “From Fiqh to Mecelle: Judicial and Religious Norms,” read the entire discussion beginning “Upon reading this report” and ending “standardized criteria for judicial reasoning”: judicial purpose. Later, in the concluding discussion before “Appendix A,” find the paragraph beginning “Additionally, one of the purposes” and read through “demands of the Ottoman bureaucracy”: standardizing judgments. Notice that Ayoub describes the code as a framework for reasoning, not a replacement for reasoning.
The change is best understood as a change in where a court’s authoritative choice is made. Within a coded subject, the drafters and state have already selected provisions that a judge is expected to apply. This narrows the judge’s scope to choose a different juristic opinion merely because it seems preferable in a particular case. It can also make the applicable rule easier for officials to locate and help similar cases receive similar treatment.
But codification does not turn judgment into mechanical reading. A judge must still establish the facts, interpret provisions, and determine whether a provision applies. The code may also leave a question open. Ayoub’s point is not that fiqh ceased to matter, but that selected fiqh doctrines acquired a new role as standardized criteria for the courts.
Keep the scope of that claim precise. The Mecelle addressed particular civil and procedural matters; it did not codify all religious conduct, family law, or criminal law. Nor did official jurisdiction guarantee identical use everywhere: Ayoub notes, for example, that although the code officially had empire-wide jurisdiction, it was not effective in Egypt.
Following one dispute through the change
Imagine a dispute about whether a buyer had sufficient opportunity to inspect a house before its sale. This is an illustration of the institutional difference, not a claim about the text of a specific Mecelle provision.
Before codification, a judge addressing the dispute might need to consult Hanafi legal works, identify the relevant opinion and its standing, and consider how the house’s layout and local practice affected the case. The judge would work within judicial constraints, but navigating the juristic material would be a larger part of the task.
In a court applying a relevant enacted provision, the judge would begin with that provision. The facts would still matter: what the buyer saw, what the rooms were like, and what the parties agreed could remain disputed. What changes is that the judge is not ordinarily at liberty to set aside the applicable code simply by selecting another fiqh opinion. A jurist outside the court could still discuss that other opinion, and an individual’s religious assessment could still extend beyond what the court decides.
This gives the historical example its central lesson: codification can preserve juristic reasoning as a source while limiting a judge’s discretion over which juristic rule receives legal effect. The relationship changes most clearly inside state institutions, not across every aspect of religious life.
Conclusion
The Mecelle drew mainly on Hanafi fiqh, but promulgating selected doctrines as a code altered their judicial role. It gave judges a shared written starting point and reduced their ability, in coded matters, to choose among alternative juristic opinions on their own. It did not eliminate interpretation, exhaust fiqh, or make every religious duty state-enforceable.
The next lesson will compare how two countries regulate a family-law issue. The Mecelle supplies the bridge: inherited jurisprudence can inform state law, while what a state selects, changes, and enforces remains a separate question.