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Lesson 13

Assessing Short-Term Responses to Oil and LNG Supply Interruptions

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Hello. The previous lesson showed that a Hormuz incident can raise insurance, freight and energy prices before any cargo is lost. Now consider the harder case: an oil or LNG delivery actually fails to arrive. The immediate question is not simply how much energy exists elsewhere, but how much usable supply can reach the affected buyer before its available inventory runs down.

Allow about 40 minutes. You will use that timing test to assess emergency oil stocks, replacement cargoes and gas-saving measures, while keeping in view a crucial difference: limited crude pipelines can bypass Hormuz, but Qatar’s LNG exports have no comparable pipeline route to overseas customers.


An emergency stock is a bridge, not a new source

An importer can meet demand temporarily by drawing on oil already held near its refineries or customers. Commercial inventories and government emergency stocks serve different purposes, but both have the same limitation: drawing them down does not replace the interrupted continuing flow. A stock release buys time for passage to resume, replacement supplies to arrive or demand to adjust.

Watch this short discussion from PBS NewsHour, Can tapping into oil reserves help stabilize prices? The interview distinguishes a large announced release from the rate at which oil can actually start moving.

Can tapping into oil reserves help stabilize prices?

Watch this PBS NewsHour interview for its explanation of what an emergency oil release can accomplish during a shipping interruption.

In delivery timing, focus on the uncertainty between agreeing to release stocks and getting crude moving. Continue through temporary relief, where the guest explains why the interruption's duration determines how useful a release will be. Treat the quantities discussed as figures from that report, not as a standing release available for every incident.

The IEA explains the stockholding obligation behind coordinated oil responses. Read the paragraph on what member countries must hold, rather than treating an announcement of a release as an immediate delivery schedule.

The Middle East and Global Energy Markets - Topics - IEA

Read the International Energy Agency’s explanation of emergency oil stocks to establish what the often-quoted “90 days” measures.

In “IEA’s role and oil stock release,” begin with the paragraph starting “Each of the IEA’s 32 Member countries.” Read the stock obligation through the end of that paragraph. Notice that the minimum is expressed as days of net oil imports for IEA member countries; it is not a promise that every affected buyer has 90 days of the particular fuel it needs.

A proposed release therefore needs more than a headline number. Check its usable volume, its maximum daily delivery rate, when deliveries begin, and whether the oil can reach and be processed by the intended recipient. Crude oil and refined products are not interchangeable at the point of use: a refinery needs suitable crude and operating capacity, while a customer waiting for diesel needs diesel delivered through a functioning distribution system.

A timing test for an oil response

Consider a hypothetical importer that loses an expected million barrels per day for ten days. A proposal says existing stocks and replacement purchases will cover the interruption. Its details are:

  • million barrels of usable local inventory, drawable at no more than million barrels per day;
  • an emergency release that can deliver million barrels per day, beginning on day 3;
  • replacement oil from outside the Gulf arriving at million barrels per day, beginning on day 6.

The ten-day loss totals million barrels. Across those ten days, the stated measures could provide at most million from local inventory, million from the emergency release and million from replacement deliveries: million barrels, leaving million unaccounted for in this simplified plan. The daily schedule exposes a further problem. On days 1 and 2, only million barrels per day can be drawn locally; oil promised for day 6 cannot satisfy demand on day 1.

That does not prove customers must immediately lose service. Other cargoes may already be on the water, or demand may be reduced. It does show what the proposal must specify before claiming success. Nor should a limited Saudi or UAE pipeline diversion be counted twice—as both “replacement oil” and a separate addition—if it supplies the same barrels.



LNG has a different set of buffers

The map below makes the route distinction visible. Its lines depict crude-oil pipelines reaching export coasts outside Hormuz; its liquefaction-plant symbols identify facilities that prepare gas for shipment as LNG. The crude pipelines are not LNG export routes.

IEA map showing the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi and UAE crude-oil pipelines that can bypass it, and regional liquefaction plants. No comparable pipeline bypass for Qatar’s seaborne LNG exports is shown.

Read the IEA’s dated LNG figures to put that distinction in perspective.

The Middle East and Global Energy Markets - Topics - IEA

Return to the IEA page for its account of LNG exports through Hormuz and the limits of alternative routes.

In “Why is the Strait of Hormuz so important?”, locate the “Alternative routes” subsection below the map. Start at “In addition, over 110 bcm of LNG passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025” and read the LNG passage through the sentence about alternative routes. Keep the 2025 date attached to the reported shares.

The IEA reports that about 93% of Qatar’s LNG exports transited Hormuz in 2025 and says there are no alternative routes to bring those volumes to market. This does not mean an overseas importer has no options. It means the importer cannot solve a missing Qatari seaborne cargo by sending that same cargo through one of the crude pipelines. It must use a buffer at its end, obtain gas or LNG from another source, or reduce gas use.

The relevant buffers differ by location. An import terminal may hold some LNG in tanks. Once LNG has been turned back into gas, an importing system may also draw on underground gas storage, where available. Neither buffer is unlimited, and neither establishes that another cargo will arrive in time. Likewise, additional regasification capacity lets a terminal process more LNG if LNG ships arrive; it does not create a replacement cargo.

The IEA’s account of earlier gas-market responses gives concrete examples of storage, import capacity and emergency cargo procurement. These are examples of response mechanisms, not guarantees that they can be scaled instantly to any Hormuz interruption.

Policy response to the crisis – Gas Market Lessons from the 2022-2023 Energy Crisis – Analysis - IEA

Read the IEA’s examples to distinguish an inventory buffer, the capacity to receive a cargo, and the ability to secure one by a deadline.

Under “Minimum gas storage obligations,” read from “The European Union adopted a new storage regulation” through the storage targets. Under “Additional LNG regasification capacity,” read from “LNG played a crucial role” through the terminal expansion, then the paragraph beginning “Although these new floating regasification facilities” through the redundancy point. Later on the page, locate the paragraph beginning “Japan’s Strategic Buffer LNG scheme”; read from “Under the scheme, JERA” through its delivery commitment. Finally, under “Korea,” read from “Korea adopted a pragmatic mix” through the fuel switching example.

The strategic-buffer example is instructive precisely because it specifies a delivery deadline: within 18 days in emergencies for a designated additional winter cargo under that scheme. It is not an 18-day guarantee for every LNG buyer. The fuel-switching example addresses the other side of the balance: where technically possible, using less gas can extend the time that existing supplies last. Such choices have costs and constraints of their own.



Assess the response against the date of need

Imagine an LNG importer, again hypothetically, whose Qatari cargo does not arrive. It has tonnes of usable LNG in its terminal and needs the equivalent of tonnes each day. A proposed replacement cargo of tonnes can arrive on day 18. With no other inflows or reductions in gas use, the inventory covers five days; it cannot bridge the gap to day 18. The replacement cargo may help from its arrival onward, but it cannot undo the intervening shortfall.

A credible revised plan would state what covers days 6 through 17: accessible gas storage, an earlier cargo that is genuinely available, supplies through an existing import connection, or a feasible reduction in gas consumption. It would also check that a terminal can receive the proposed ship and that any stored gas can reach the consumers who need it. Simply citing global LNG production or spare terminal capacity would not settle those questions.

For either fuel, use the same disciplined assessment:

  1. Define the lost delivery and its duration. A delayed cargo, a partial reduction and a sustained interruption create different gaps.
  2. Count accessible inventory at a realistic draw rate. Identify its location and whether it is crude, a needed oil product, LNG or usable gas.
  3. Date each replacement delivery. Specify its source, committed volume, transport and arrival—not just its existence somewhere in the market.
  4. Check the daily balance until normal deliveries resume. A sufficient total arriving too late can still leave an early shortage.

The test also separates a physical response from a price response. Buying a competing cargo at a higher price may secure supply for one importer while leaving another short. Emergency stocks can cushion an oil interruption; gas storage and demand flexibility can cushion an LNG interruption. None is equivalent to restoring the original export flow indefinitely.



Key takeaways

Short-term responses buy time. Their value depends on accessible stocks, daily delivery limits, replacement supplies and the date each cargo reaches the affected market—not on headline volume alone. Oil can draw on coordinated emergency stock releases, though suitable barrels still have to reach users. Qatar’s missing LNG cargoes have no comparable pipeline bypass around Hormuz, so importers must rely on their own buffers, other suppliers or lower gas demand.

The next lesson brings these distinctions together to evaluate news claims about a Hormuz disruption against evidence on vessel movements, lost volumes, duration and realistic alternatives.