Hello. This module turns from federal campaign-finance rules to state restrictions. The central question in this lesson is narrow but important: if a state has a long history of corporate influence in its elections, can it keep a ban on independent corporate election spending after Citizens United?
The distinction you will need is between a corporation paying for its own advertisement without coordinating with a candidate and giving money or coordinated support to a candidate’s campaign. American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock concerns the first kind of spending. By the end of the lesson, you should be able to explain both why Montana defended its law and why the U.S. Supreme Court held that its defense could not overcome binding precedent.
Why Montana thought its law was different
Montana had restricted corporate spending in candidate elections since 1912. Its law barred a corporation from making an expenditure “in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.” A corporation could instead establish a separate political fund—a PAC—to participate under different rules. The provision’s wording reached more than one kind of transaction, but the constitutional conflict that matters here was its application to independent expenditures made from corporate treasury funds.
In 2010, Citizens United held that the federal government could not prohibit corporations and unions from using treasury funds for independent election advocacy on account of their corporate identity. Montana’s Supreme Court nevertheless upheld its state restriction in 2011. It reasoned that the state’s particular history made it especially vulnerable to corporate control and identified an additional concern about the integrity of its elected judiciary.
Read the Federal Election Commission’s case summary for the sequence of decisions and the state court’s rationale. Notice the difference between Montana’s argument for retaining its law and the U.S. Supreme Court’s later ruling on whether that argument succeeded.
FEC | Legal | American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock
Read the Federal Election Commission’s case summary to establish what Montana regulated, why its Supreme Court upheld the restriction, and what happened on appeal.
Under “Summary,” begin with the case account. Continue through the subsections “Montana Supreme Court decision” and “U.S. Supreme Court decision”; stop before “U.S. Supreme Court No. 11-1179” and the document links. Pay particular attention to the state court’s claims about Montana’s political history and judicial elections.
That history matters to understanding the dispute. Montana was not merely claiming that corporate spending was unpopular; its court concluded that local experience demonstrated a serious risk to democratic government. But the existence of a substantial state interest does not, by itself, establish that a particular restriction is constitutionally available. The next step is to identify what Citizens United had already decided about independent spending as a way to address corruption.
What the U.S. Supreme Court decided
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in American Tradition Partnership is unusually short. It did not conduct a lengthy, fresh weighing of Montana’s evidence against a newly formulated test. Instead, it treated Citizens United as controlling. In the Court’s words, there could be “no serious doubt” that the earlier holding applied to Montana’s law: the state’s arguments had either been rejected in Citizens United or failed to distinguish the two cases meaningfully.
Read the opinion itself, including the dissent. The majority disposition is on pages 516–517; Justice Breyer’s dissent runs from pages 517–518. These few pages are worth reading slowly: they show a disagreement not only about the effects of corporate spending, but about what a lower court may do when it believes a Supreme Court precedent fits local circumstances poorly.
American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. ...
Read the U.S. Supreme Court’s short decision to see how directly it applies Citizens United, then read the dissent to understand the objection.
On page 516, begin the Court’s per curiam opinion at “A Montana state law provides that a” and read the Court’s reasoning through the reversal on page 517. Then, under “Breyer, J., dissenting” on pages 517–518, read the dissent from its opening through its final sentence. Keep track of which statements describe binding law and which challenge that law.
The majority’s governing proposition came from Citizens United: political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation. Its application here is more precise than the slogan “corporations may spend money.” The relevant activity was independent advocacy about candidates, funded by a corporation rather than coordinated with a candidate’s campaign. Citizens United had rejected a comparable federal prohibition, including the argument that independent corporate expenditures could be banned to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Montana could not preserve a comparable state ban simply by presenting a state-specific version of an argument the Supreme Court had rejected.
The Court cited the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which helps explain the relationship between the two courts. State judges are bound by controlling federal constitutional law as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Separately, the First Amendment’s protections apply against states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The practical result is that a state cannot make an otherwise forbidden restriction valid just by placing it in state election law rather than federal election law.
This does not mean every difference between state and federal election law is constitutionally irrelevant. A meaningful distinction in the regulated activity or the governing legal question could matter. The Court’s conclusion was that Montana’s arguments did not meaningfully distinguish this ban on independent corporate election spending from the restriction already addressed in Citizens United.
The dissent and the limits of the holding
Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by three other justices, gives Montana’s position its strongest explanation in this short record. He disputed Citizens United’s conclusion about corruption: in his view, spending that is technically independent can sometimes function much like a direct contribution in generating a quid pro quo arrangement. He also argued that, even accepting Citizens United, the Montana court’s findings about its own political history should have mattered.
There are two distinct claims here. The first challenges Citizens United’s underlying assessment of independent spending. The second argues that Montana’s evidence could justify a different outcome without formally overruling Citizens United. The majority rejected the proposed distinction; Breyer would have preferred reconsideration of the precedent or its application. His dissent explains why the issue was contested, but it is not the rule that governed the case.
That makes Bullock a useful lesson in precedent. A state court may document a problem carefully and give serious reasons for its policy. It still cannot disregard a controlling U.S. Supreme Court holding because it believes its local evidence warrants a different constitutional balance. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and reversed Montana’s judgment on June 25, 2012. This was a final Supreme Court disposition of that appeal, not merely an interim order allowing spending while litigation continued.
At the same time, be exact about what the decision leaves open. Bullock did not hold that corporations may make unlimited direct contributions to candidates, or that spending coordinated with a campaign must be treated as independent. Nor did it abolish campaign-finance reporting and disclaimer rules. Its immediate lesson is that a state cannot enforce a prohibition on independent corporate candidate-election expenditures that conflicts with Citizens United.
Applying Bullock to a state restriction
Consider a corporation that uses its own general funds to purchase an advertisement urging voters to defeat a state legislative candidate. It chooses the message, placement, and timing without cooperating with the candidate or an opponent’s campaign. Suppose the state prohibits that advertisement because it is funded by a corporation and points to a documented history of corporate influence as its justification.
This is the core Bullock situation. The advertisement is independent candidate-election advocacy. Under Citizens United as applied in Bullock, the state cannot evade the First Amendment holding by invoking its distinctive history or by arguing that a corporate PAC remains available as another route for speech. The alternative route does not answer the objection to banning the corporation’s own independent advocacy.
Change one fact, however, and the legal classification may change. If the corporation works with a campaign on the advertisement, calling the payment an “expenditure” does not make it independent; rules for coordinated spending and contributions become relevant. If the state instead requires reporting or an on-ad disclaimer rather than prohibiting the advertisement, that raises a different constitutional question. Bullock is a constraint on a particular ban, not a declaration that all regulations involving corporate election activity fail.
A reliable way to read a new state-law claim is therefore to identify, in order:
- The activity regulated: an independent advertisement, a direct contribution, coordinated support, or something else.
- What the law does: prohibits the activity, limits an amount, or requires information to be disclosed.
- The asserted distinction: whether it changes the constitutional issue or merely restates an argument rejected in Citizens United.
For an independent corporate advertisement prohibited because of its source, Bullock supplies a clear answer to the third point: a state’s separate election system and particular history did not, in that case, free it from Citizens United.
Key takeaway
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock applied Citizens United to a state ban on independent corporate candidate-election spending. Montana offered substantial state-specific reasons for its restriction; the U.S. Supreme Court held that they had already been rejected or did not meaningfully distinguish the controlling precedent. The holding is powerful, but specific: do not turn protection for independent expenditures into a claim that direct contributions, coordination, or disclosure are all unrestricted.
The next lesson will test another boundary: how the analysis differs when advocacy concerns a ballot measure rather than the election of a candidate.