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Lesson 20

Constitutional Assessment of State Restrictions on Corporate Political Spending

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Welcome to the final lesson. In the previous lesson, you separated a law’s enactment from an interim court order and a final constitutional ruling. Now you can apply that discipline to the First Amendment question itself: if a state conditions a corporation’s charter on refraining from political spending, what activity does the condition reach, what standard governs it, and what do binding decisions permit you to conclude?

This lesson brings together the course’s distinctions among contributions, coordinated spending, and independent expenditures. Allow about 40 minutes, including the two short opinion readings.


Start with the transaction, not the word “spending”

Consider this hypothetical enacted law:

A corporation chartered by the state will lose its charter if it uses general treasury funds to pay for an advertisement expressly urging voters to elect or defeat a candidate in a state election. The rule applies even when the corporation acts without consulting or coordinating with the candidate.

The charter condition is consequential, but it does not change the character of the transaction. On these facts, the corporation pays to communicate its own election message to voters. It does not give money to a candidate, and the advertisement is assumed to be independent. Losing a charter for making that advertisement burdens the corporation’s ability to engage in political advocacy.

Those facts should appear near the beginning of a constitutional assessment. If instead the corporation transferred treasury funds to a candidate’s campaign, the analysis would concern a contribution. If it produced the advertisement in coordination with the campaign, the spending could be treated as an in-kind contribution. Neither transaction becomes an independent expenditure merely because someone calls it “political spending.”

The hypothetical also has a deliberate limit: it concerns candidate-election advocacy, not a ballot measure. The earlier Bellotti lesson addressed corporate speech about ballot measures; here, Citizens United supplies the central rule for independent candidate-election advocacy.



Read the governing First Amendment rule

Read selected passages from the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission majority opinion, reproduced by Cornell’s Legal Information Institute. Rather than reading the entire opinion, follow its argument from scrutiny, through the contribution–expenditure distinction, to the proposed justification based on corporate charters.

CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Read the majority opinion to identify both the rule a court must apply and the arguments the state cannot treat as unanswered questions.

In the majority opinion, find the paragraph beginning “For these reasons, political speech must prevail.” Read the scrutiny rule through its last sentence. Note what the government must establish. Next, just before the opinion’s subsection marked “A,” find the paragraph beginning “Premised on mistrust of governmental power.” Read speaker distinctions through the following paragraph. Focus on why allowing some speakers but not others raises a First Amendment problem. In the later discussion of Buckley, find “Before addressing the constitutionality.” Read the spending distinction through the end of the second paragraph. Track why the opinion treats a payment to a candidate differently from an uncoordinated expenditure. Finally, in subsection “B,” under “1,” find the discussion of Austin’s antidistortion rationale. Read the equalization argument in the paragraph that rejects leveling speakers’ influence. Then find “Either as support for its antidistortion rationale” and read the charter argument through the end of that paragraph, including its sentence about forfeiting First Amendment rights in exchange for corporate advantages.

For a restriction on independent political advocacy like the hypothetical, Citizens United applies strict scrutiny: the state must show that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve it. Calling charter forfeiture a condition of incorporation rather than a “spending ban” does not remove its burden on speech. A corporation must either forgo the independent advertisement or risk losing its charter.

The state has arguments worth stating fairly. It grants corporations legal advantages, including limited liability and perpetual life, and could contend that those advantages help accumulate funds that may be used to gain political influence. It might point to evidence of actual corruption or its appearance and argue that its charter condition targets only treasury-funded corporate spending, leaving other avenues for political participation.

But an assessment must distinguish an argument a state can make from one the Supreme Court has accepted. Citizens United rejects the notion that corporate advantages allow the state to demand forfeiture of First Amendment rights as their price. It also rejects limiting a speaker’s political advocacy to equalize the relative influence of speakers. Under the majority’s analysis, the absence of coordination is central to why a genuinely independent expenditure differs from a large payment to a candidate.



Test the state-law argument against Bullock

Citizens United involved a federal restriction. Could a state reach a different result by relying on its own political history or its authority over corporations? The Supreme Court confronted the state-law question in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock. Read both the Court’s brief ruling and Justice Breyer’s dissent. The dissent helps identify the strongest opposing argument, but it is not the controlling disposition.

Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516 (2012)

Read the Supreme Court’s short ruling to see how Citizens United applies to a state restriction, then read the dissent to understand the corruption argument the ruling did not adopt.

In the opening, unsigned per curiam opinion, begin with the description “A Montana state law provides that a” and read the Court’s ruling through the reversal. Focus on its answer to whether Citizens United applies to the state law. In the separate opinion labeled as Justice Breyer’s dissent, begin “I disagree with the Court’s holding” and read the dissent to its end. Notice his argument about evidence of corruption, and his acknowledgment of what the Court’s disposition does.

The controlling answer in Bullock is direct: a state cannot set aside Citizens United when restricting corporate election expenditures. Justice Breyer argued that technically independent spending could create corruption and that the state’s evidence deserved weight. That is a serious critique of the majority’s premise. It is not, however, a holding authorizing a lower court to uphold a state ban on that basis.

Nor did Bullock decide every imaginable term of a corporate charter. The precise charter-forfeiture provision in our hypothetical remains hypothetical. The task is to apply the binding rules to its actual effect: it penalizes treasury-funded independent candidate advocacy because the speaker is a corporation. A different label for the restriction does not, by itself, distinguish the protected activity in Citizens United and Bullock.



Write a bounded constitutional assessment

A useful short assessment has four parts, usually within one or two paragraphs:

  1. Identify the activity and burden. Specify who pays, who receives the money, whether a candidate is involved, and whether spending is coordinated. State what the law does to that activity.
  2. Name the governing standard and precedent. For a restriction on the assumed independent advocacy, apply Citizens United’s strict-scrutiny framework; use Bullock for its application to states.
  3. Present the strongest case on each side. Give the state’s charter and corruption arguments their due, then explain which responses binding precedent has already supplied.
  4. State a qualified conclusion. Predict the likely result for the specified restriction, without claiming that all election-money rules are invalid—or that an enacted hypothetical law has already been struck down.

Here is a model assessment of the provision above:

The enacted charter condition penalizes a corporation for using treasury funds to buy an advertisement advocating a candidate’s defeat without candidate coordination. That is a restriction on an independent expenditure, not a limit on a contribution to the candidate. Under Citizens United, the burden on this political advocacy is subject to strict scrutiny. The state can argue that it confers valuable corporate privileges and has an interest in preventing corruption or its appearance. But Citizens United rejects corporate privileges and equalizing political influence as bases for suppressing independent speech, and Bullock applies its rule to a state corporate-expenditure restriction despite state-specific corruption arguments. On the stated facts, charter forfeiture for the independent advertisement is therefore very likely unconstitutional under binding precedent. This conclusion does not resolve the validity of limits on direct candidate contributions, coordinated spending treated as contributions, or properly designed disclosure requirements. It is a constitutional assessment of the hypothetical law, not a report of a court ruling on it.

The qualification in the final sentences is substantive, not merely cautious wording. A state cannot rescue a restriction on independent advertisements by calling it a charter term. Equally, a decision protecting those advertisements does not turn every corporate payment connected to an election into protected independent spending.



Key takeaways

For a new state restriction, classify the transaction before assessing the law. A charter penalty on an uncoordinated corporate candidate advertisement burdens an independent expenditure and faces the Citizens United rule; Bullock confirms that states must follow it. State interests in addressing corruption deserve accurate description, but neither a state’s chartering power nor a dissent’s contrary view displaces the controlling holdings.

This completes the course’s central distinction: courts assess the regulated activity and the applicable precedent, not “campaign money” as one undifferentiated category. When reading news of a challenge, keep that merits assessment separate from whether the restriction is proposed, enacted, temporarily blocked, or finally adjudicated.