Introduction
In our last lesson, we explored the beautiful symmetry between the syntactic world of proofs () and the semantic world of truth () in first-order logic, bridged by the soundness and completeness theorems. This entire picture, however, rests on a foundational assumption of classical logic: the principle of bivalence, which states that every proposition is either true or false, independently of our knowledge or ability to prove it. This principle gives us the law of the excluded middle (LEM), which states that for any proposition , the disjunction is a logical truth.
Today, we take our first step into a radically different philosophical landscape. We will challenge this classical foundation by examining the philosophical system of intuitionism, developed by the Dutch mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer. Your learning outcome for this lesson is to analyse Brouwer's philosophical case against the law of the excluded middle based on the nature of mathematical construction.
We will see that for Brouwer, the rejection of LEM is not an arbitrary logical choice; it is a necessary consequence of a deep philosophical conviction about the very nature of mathematics and truth.
1. The Core of Intuitionism: Mathematics as Mental Construction
Brouwer's starting point is a rejection of the two dominant views of mathematics of his time:
- Platonism: The view that mathematical objects (numbers, sets, etc.) exist in an abstract, eternal realm, and mathematical truths are discovered, not created.
- Formalism: The view that mathematics is a game of manipulating symbols according to fixed rules, without any intrinsic meaning.
In place of these, Brouwer proposed that mathematics is a creation of the human mind.
Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Brouwer provides a concise summary of his core philosophical stance. This will give us the fundamental premise of his entire system.
Please read the section titled '3. Brief Characterisation of Brouwer’s Intuitionism'. Focus on the connection it draws between truth, experience, and mental construction.
The key takeaway from this reading is Brouwer's radical thesis: "there are no non-experienced truths." For an intuitionist, a mathematical statement is true if, and only if, the subject has performed a mental construction that verifies it. Truth is not about correspondence with an external reality; truth is the successful completion of a construction in the mind.
This idea is the first of what Brouwer called the "two acts of intuitionism."
Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Intuitionism formalises this core idea as the 'First Act of Intuitionism'.
Please read the subsection '2.1 The two acts of intuitionism', focusing on the description of the 'first act'. Notice how it grounds mathematics in the perception of time and separates it from language.
This "First Act" has a profound consequence that reverses the traditional relationship between logic and mathematics. For a logicist like Frege or Russell, logic is the foundation upon which mathematics is built. For Brouwer, it is the other way around:
- Mathematics is the primary, pre-linguistic activity of mental construction.
- Logic is a secondary, descriptive science. It codifies the patterns of reasoning that have been found to be valid within the practice of mathematical construction.
Logic does not provide the rules for mathematics; mathematics provides the subject matter for logic.
2. The Argument Against the Law of the Excluded Middle
With this constructivist philosophy in place, we can now analyse Brouwer's case against the law of the excluded middle (LEM).
Classically, LEM states that for any proposition , the statement is a tautology. This is justified by the principle of bivalence: is either true or it is false. If it's true, is true. If it's false, then is true, and is again true.
However, the intuitionist redefines the meaning of the logical connectives in terms of constructions. This is often called the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation.
Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
To understand the intuitionistic critique of LEM, we must first understand the intuitionistic meaning of 'or' (∨). The SEP article on Intuitionism explains this via the BHK-interpretation.
Please read the subsection '3.1 The BHK-interpretation'. Focus on the conditions required for proving a disjunction (A ∨ B) and what this implies for (A ∨ ¬A).
As the article explains, to have a proof of , you must have:
- a proof of , or
- a proof of .
Now, apply this to the Law of the Excluded Middle, . To assert this, an intuitionist requires:
- a proof of , or
- a proof of (which means, a construction that shows a proof of leads to a contradiction).
The problem is that for many mathematical propositions, we have neither. Think of an unsolved problem like the Goldbach Conjecture ("Every even integer greater than 2 is the sum of two primes"). Let's call it .
- A classical mathematician says the statement is trivially true. The conjecture is either true or false, even if we don't know which.
- An intuitionist says that since we currently have no proof of and no proof of , we are not justified in asserting .
To accept LEM is to believe in "non-experienced truths"—to believe that a statement's truth-value is settled in advance, independent of our constructive activity. This is exactly what Brouwer's philosophy denies.
This leads to the rejection of proofs that depend on LEM. Such proofs are called non-constructive existence proofs. They show that something must exist without providing a method for finding it.
Mark van Atten: Brouwer and the Mathematics of the Continuum
Mark van Atten provides a classic and powerful example of a non-constructive proof that an intuitionist would reject. This clearly illustrates how relying on LEM can be seen as philosophically problematic from a constructivist viewpoint.
Please watch the segment from 03:37 to 05:16. The example concerns whether there exist irrational numbers A and B such that A^B is rational. Notice how the classical proof hinges on an 'either/or' step, which is an application of LEM.
The classical proof is clever, but from an intuitionistic perspective, it is profoundly unsatisfying. It proves that a solution exists without constructing that solution. Since truth is construction, the proof fails to establish the truth of the conclusion because it doesn't tell us what A and B are.
3. From Unjustified to False: The Intuitionistic Continuum
So far, we have seen that LEM is considered unjustified in cases where we lack a proof. Brouwer went further, arguing that for certain domains, LEM is demonstrably false. His main tool for this was his theory of the continuum, based on the notion of choice sequences.
A choice sequence is a sequence of numbers (e.g., digits of a real number) that is not determined in advance by a rule, but is created by a series of free choices over time. You can think of it as a process of construction that is perpetually unfinished.
Mark van Atten: Brouwer and the Mathematics of the Continuum
In this segment, Mark van Atten introduces choice sequences and explains why their inherent 'incompleteness' or 'free growth' directly conflicts with the Law of the Excluded Middle.
Please watch from 18:19 to 21:38. Focus on the question of whether two choice sequences, α and β, are identical. Why can't we assert 'α = β or α ≠β'?
As the video explains, at any finite stage, two choice sequences and may have identical initial segments. But because their future is open, there is no pre-existing fact of the matter about whether they will eventually diverge or not. Therefore, we cannot assert the disjunction . The law of the excluded middle fails for properties of these "in-progress" objects.
This concept allowed Brouwer to construct strong counterexamples to universally quantified versions of LEM. The most famous is this:
Classical statement: "For every real number , is rational or is irrational." ()
Brouwer was able to show that this statement is intuitionistically false. He did this by constructing a choice sequence (defining a real number) where the choice of each new digit depends on the status of an unsolved mathematical problem. This creates a real number for which it is impossible, in principle, to decide whether it is rational or not. Because we cannot make this decision for all real numbers, the universally quantified statement is refuted.
Mark van Atten: Brouwer and the Mathematics of the Continuum
Van Atten concludes by summarizing how this kind of reasoning leads to a strong refutation of the universally quantified form of LEM.
Please watch the short segment from 28:29 to 29:21. This confirms that for certain statements, LEM isn't just unproven but is actually considered false in intuitionistic mathematics.
Conclusion
Today we have analysed Brouwer's profound philosophical critique of a foundational principle of classical logic. His argument is not a mere technical quibble; it stems from a complete re-evaluation of the nature of mathematical truth.
Key Takeaways:
- Constructivist Foundation: Brouwer's intuitionism is founded on the idea that mathematics is a mental activity. A proposition is true if and only if we have a mental construction that proves it. "Truth is experienced."
- Rejection of Bivalence: This foundation entails the rejection of the classical principle of bivalence. If we have no proof for and no proof for , then has no truth-value.
- Argument Against LEM: The law of the excluded middle () is rejected because asserting it requires having a proof of or a proof of . For unsolved problems, we have neither, so we cannot assert the disjunction.
- Unacceptable Proofs: This renders non-constructive proofs—those that prove existence by contradiction or by cases without providing an instance—unacceptable. The example is a paradigm case.
- Strong Refutation: Using the concept of choice sequences in his theory of the continuum, Brouwer went beyond showing LEM was unjustified. He argued that universally quantified forms of LEM, such as "every real number is either rational or irrational," are demonstrably false.
Preview of the Next Lesson:
We've seen that the intuitionistic meaning of the logical connectives is central to Brouwer's argument. In the next lesson, we will delve deeper into this, formally evaluating the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation as an alternative account of the meaning of all the logical connectives. This will allow us to see how intuitionistic logic functions as a complete, coherent system in its own right, rather than just a restriction of classical logic.